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Aim and Scope of This Article
In ABout the fourth century ce, the Buddhist scholar Asaṅga (c. 315–390) provided a rational, scholastic, and theoretical basis for the 
doctrines of the Pure Land sutras. Before Asaṅga, Mahayana sutras had 
propounded the perspective of rebirth in one of several pure Buddha lands, 
most notably Sukhāvatī, showing only rudimentary attempts at a system-
atization of these doctrines. This article contains an outline of Asaṅga’s 
systematics and their later reception by the Korean scholar Wonhyo 元曉 
(617–686 CE).1 In addition, some glimpses of Sukhāvatī doctrines in con-
temporary Mahayana Buddhism will be provided, referring firstly to the 
views of Nakamura Hajime, and further below to those of Thích Nhất Hạnh 
and Dennis Hirota.
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In order to assess the premodern Pure Land thought of Asaṅga and Won-
hyo, exemplary passages from their writings are presented and evaluated, 
along with some of the comments by Vasubandhu (c. 330–410) on Asaṅga’s 
views. The analysis will focus on the question of how these writers align 
the ontology and soteriology of the Pure Lands with their understanding of 
Mahayana systematics in general.
Methodological Considerations
Ever since its first English publication in 1980, Nakamura Hajime’s Indian 
Buddhism has remained a standard companion to the study of Buddhism in 
its homeland. Nakamura relates the history of Buddhism in ancient India, 
organized into dense and concise sections, and provides solid bibliographical 
references for further research. An updated version of this standard work has 
not yet been produced, and thus the original edition of 1980 remains among 
the indispensable sources for research in this field. Though mostly con-
cerned with a factual view on ancient history, Nakamura exceptionally dis-
cusses developments in research history, thus providing a minimal amount 
of “discourse analysis,” as we might call it nowadays. Notably, in his sec-
tion on Pure Land texts and traditions, Nakamura, in his usual conciseness, 
includes some remarks that surpass mere fact-finding about ancient cultural 
history: “Now time has elapsed. How should contemporary Pure Land Bud-
dhists interpret [the] Pure Land? Why is it that Pure Land Buddhism is not 
welcomed in the West?”2 Nakamura does not answer this question directly. 
Rather, he concludes his section on Sukhāvatī texts by saying: 
However, more intellectual and sophisticated Pure Land Bud-
dhism in later days in various countries could not be satisfied with 
the figure of Amitābha related hyperbolically in scriptures. What 
is Amitābha? Is he a person, or a principle? Some of them adopted 
the interpretation that his essential body is dharma, the universal 
law.  The idea of the Pure Land also had various unclear points, 
and it caused a controversy in later days whether [the] Pure Land 
is a Reward Land or a Transformation Land.3
Quite surely, Nakamura’s question of why Pure Land Buddhism did not 
receive a warm reception in the West is not intended to be merely a “dis-
interested search for truth”4 about the history of Buddhist culture. It is at 
2 Nakamura 1980, p. 207.
3 Ibid., pp. 208–9. On this debate, see also Tanaka 1990, pp. 105–6.
4 Russell 1945, p. 835.
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the same time a question about the future of Buddhism, with far-reaching 
implications for the future of Buddhist studies as an academic field. This 
question of persisting relevance has motivated the production of this article 
and delineated its aim and scope, under the presupposition that an accurate 
understanding of the past provides the most solid foundation for decisions in 
the present with consequences in the future.5 As is common in other fields of 
science, I conduct basic research here in the hope that it may help to develop 
practical solutions. The present study is “disinterested” only insofar as an 
attempt is made to assess the historical facts as objectively as possible and 
thereby shed more light on disputed topics, while keeping in mind that stud-
ies in the history of thought have in recent decades been criticized for a lack 
of objectivity and self-reflection.6 Awareness of the motivation underlying 
any kind of academic writing does indeed help in minimizing bias, but be 
that as it may, this article is primarily written with the pragmatic aim of gain-
ing reliable information about premodern and modern Pure Land thought.
Some further words on methodology are necessary with regard to another 
point that has been the subject of recent debates: when studying the Pure 
Land traditions, we recognize a considerable gap in education and ambi-
tion between those who devised the pertinent texts and religious practices, 
on the one hand, and a significant proportion of the followers for whom 
these were meant, on the other. In recent decades, it has rightly been ques-
tioned whether it is legitimate to study the writings of the erudite few while 
neglecting the culture of the common people, the vast majority. In fact, I 
admire many of the rather anthropological studies of Buddhism for their 
clarity and profundity,7 and their scheme seems to me just as valid as the 
5 These considerations apply to premodern Pure Land thought as a whole. More specifi-
cally, Indian Pure Land thought has been outlined in the framework of a recent publication 
on Tibetan Pure Land culture (Halkias 2013). A thorough evaluation of Halkias’s publication 
made a swift reassessment of the respective sources seem sensible. Nonetheless, although I 
will consistently refer to the pertinent pages of his work, it seemed more beneficial to pres-
ent new translations and interpretations rather than discuss Halkias’s views and methodol-
ogy. For a critical review, see Jones 2014, p. 2.
6 The academic discourse about objectivism and subjectivism in research methodology, 
which had its peak in the late 1980s, has been summarized and evaluated by Sokal and Bric-
mont (1999, p. 16). I agree with the authors’ assessment and, unable to go into detail here, 
warmly recommend their article to the interested reader.
7 See, for example, Mumford’s (1989) reflections on the cultural exchanges between 
Gurung shamanist funeral rites and Tibetan Buddhist rites in two neighboring Himalayan 
villages or Hodous’s (1924) records of conversations about Buddhism during his 1901–1917 
stay in China.
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philological approach followed in this article.8 Still, when studying ancient 
culture, we must acknowledge that globally, most regions have shifted from 
more than ninety percent illiteracy in premodern times to more than ninety 
percent literacy today;9 the former majority has now become the minor-
ity, at least in the countries to which Pure Land Buddhism has spread. This 
development is one of several reasons that commend pursuing both anthro-
pology and philology on an equal footing.
The gap between authors and followers seems to play a role, for exam-
ple, in the disputed question of whether Pure Land practices aim at rebirth 
in the Pure Land as the final goal, or whether rebirth in the Pure Land is 
just a means to achieving nirvana, which in some passages is specified as 
full Buddhahood, the non-abiding (Skt. apratiṣṭhita) nirvana.10 While the 
sources analyzed in this article clearly affirm the latter, the philologist has 
to be aware that there were (and are) followers aiming at the former, often 
less for themselves but rather for their parents and ancestors.11 Keeping this 
in mind, the current article will follow Nakamura’s suggestion and trace 
some of the more “intellectual and sophisticated” theories on the existence 
of the Pure Land and its place on the Buddhist path.12
Ontology: Mind, Matter, and Emptiness in the Pure Lands
In the passage quoted above, Nakamura mentions several philosophical issues 
of actuality, two of which seem most essential: firstly, whether the Buddha 
Amitābha is, in Nakamura’s phrasing, a “principle,” and secondly “whether 
his essential body is dharma, the universal law.” If both questions were to 
be answered in the positive, then what would this principle, this universal 
law, comprise concretely? In other words, what principle could the Bud-
dha Amitābha symbolize? The possible interpretations are probably innu-
merable: compassion, wisdom, benevolent guidance, care for the deceased 
of previous generations, and other principles are available to the exegete. 
Here, I would like to focus on what is likely the most central principle in 
8 See also Kapstein’s (2014, p. 3) balanced view on this issue.
9 Suzuki (1997, pp. 72, 74), for example, records a poem in praise of the nenbutsu 念仏 
composed in the first half of the twentieth century, saying, “As I am illiterate, I dictate it, and 
my son writes it down.” 
10 On nirvana in Sukhāvatī, see, for example, Harvey 2013, pp. 165, 216. Buswell and Lopez 
(2013, s.v. Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra) rather taciturnly state that “all of the beings born there will 
achieve enlightenment in their next lifetime.” 
11 See also Bayer 2013, pp. 77–81.
12 Several fundamental methodological issues cannot be addressed here; again, I can only 
recommend the abovementioned treatment by Sokal and Bricmont (1999, esp. p. 2).
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Mahayana Buddhist thought, the “highest meaning” (Skt. paramārtha), 
which is, essentially, emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) and its complete understand-
ing. In other words, it is indeed the dharmakāya. Already one of the oldest 
Mahayana texts, the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, contains a wealth of passages that 
describe the Pure Lands as empty or illusory, just like our ordinary world is 
ultimately, but only ultimately, empty:13
The [Tathāgatas] purify the Buddha fields,
Perceiving of the activities of beings 
Just as the field of space,
Not having the conception of beings as beings.14
In terms of the body of a Buddha, the same text teaches:
Venerable Ānanda, the Tathāgatas have the dharmakāya [as their 
body], not the body of the flesh (āmiṣa). The Tathāgatas have the 
supramundane body because they have completely transcended 
(samatikrāntāḥ) all mundane dharmas. . . . The body of the Bud-
dha is not composed15 and [it has] passed beyond all verbal des-
ignations.16
13 Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 10.
14 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 7, par. 7, verse 15): buddhakṣetrāṇi śodhenti sa[t]tvānāṃ caritaṃ 
yathā / ākāśakṣetrānuprāptā na sa[t]tve sa[t]tvasaṃjñinaḥ //. Cf. the translation of T no. 
475, 14: 550a1–2 by McRae (2004, p. 154): “Although he understands that the buddha lands 
/ And sentient beings are empty / He always practices purifying his land / Teaching the hosts 
of beings.”
15 My rendering “composed” adheres closely to the etymology of saṃskṛta in the sense of 
“making, producing” (kṛ) by means of putting “together” (saṃ; to the same effect, Tib. ’dus 
byas). This does not necessarily imply that the object thus “composed” consists of a combina-
tion of several material or spiritual substances. Especially in Buddhist usage, a saṃskṛta phe-
nomenon can be “conditioned” in a merely abstract way, too, namely conditioned by causes 
that are no longer present in the phenomenon. When understood in that way, the prefix saṃ 
no longer adds the more palpable connotation of “together” to the word, but rather the well-
attested, more abstract, and surely secondary, connotation of “finished, complete.” The Chinese 
equivalent youwei 有爲 (Yokoyama and Hirosawa 1996, s.v.), for example, does not express 
any combinative connotation. 
16 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 3, par. 45): api tu bhadantānanda dharmakāyās tathāgatā 
nāmiṣakāyāḥ / lokottarakāyās tathāgatāḥ sarvalokadharmasamatikrāntāḥ / [ . . . ] asaṃskṛtas 
tathāgatasya kāyaḥ sarvasaṃkhyāvigataḥ. Although the situation seems to be quite com-
plex (see Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas, p. xiii), the translators into Tibetan appear to have misread 
sarvasaṃkhyāvigataḥ as sarvasaṃskāravigataḥ (see ibid., n. 2). Hence Thurman 1976, p. 33: 
“The body of a Tathāgata is uncompounded and free of all formative activity.” Cf. translation 
of T no. 475, 14: 542a by McRae (2004, p. 107).
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In fact, it is not only “emptiness” that the Buddha realizes, but more specifi-
cally, the absence of duality:
The Buddhas, the Bhagavats, are those who have, in the world, the 
divine eye. They do not abandon the place of meditative concen-
tration; they see all Buddha fields, and with them, duality does not 
unfold ( /they are not overpowered by [the concept of] “two”).17
There is always a danger of confusing “emptiness” with mere nothingness 
or mere absence, missing out on the more subtle, correct understanding of 
emptiness:
“Matter” and “what is empty” [form] a duality. Indeed, matter is 
exactly emptiness. It is not that emptiness [arises] from the anni-
hilation of matter: The very nature of matter is emptiness. In the 
same way, feeling, apperception,18 impulses, and perception [on 
the one hand, and] what is empty [on the other hand, appear mis-
takenly as] a duality. Indeed, perception is exactly emptiness.19 It 
is not that emptiness [arises] from the annihilation of perception. 
The very nature of perception is emptiness. Here, an appropriate 
understanding, with wisdom ( jñāna), with regards to five appropri-
ated skandhas,20 that is entry into nonduality.21
The wording of this passage undoubtedly sounds familiar since it closely 
resembles the most prominent lines of the prajñāpāramitā sutras. Still, it 
17 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 3, par. 31): buddhā bhagavanto loke divyacakṣuṣo ye 
samāhitāvasthāṃ ca na vijahati sarvabuddhakṣetrāṇi ca paśyanti / na ca dvayaprabhāvitāḥ /. 
Cf. translation of T no. 475, 14: 541b by McRae (2004, p. 103).
18 On the equivalent “apperception” for saṃjñā, see Bayer 2010, pp. 314–20, n. 41. Cf. 
Schmithausen 2014, pp. 11–12, n. 3.
19 Only the first of the skandhas, matter, and the last one, perception, are designated as 
being exactly emptiness, with the other three being treated slightly differently in the middle. 
This is clearly just a way of avoiding repetition, so that what is said here applies to all five 
skandhas equally. As an example for the abbreviation of lists in the Heart Sutra, see Nattier 
1992, pp. 162–63.
20 Literally, “the one who understands accordingly (anubodha) with regard to the five 
appropriation-skandhas.”
21 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 8, par. 17): rūpaṃ śūnyam iti dvayam etat / rupam eva 
hi śūnyatā / na rūpavināśāc chūnyatā / rūpaprakṛtir eva śūnyatā / evaṃ vedanā saṃjñā 
saṃskārā vijñānaṃ śūnyam iti dvayam etat / vijñānam eva hi śūnyatā / na vijñānavināśāc 
chūnyatā / vijñānaprakṛtir eva śūnyatā / yo ’tra pañcasūpādānaskandheṣv evaṃ 
jñānānubodho ’yam advayapraveśaḥ /. Cf. translation of T no. 475, 14: 551a (ch. 9) by 
McRae (2004, p. 161).
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seems that the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa places more emphasis on the principle 
of nonduality, lest emptiness be misunderstood as nothingness. Rather than 
an absolute “real” void underlying illusory manifestations, the absolute is 
a mode of existence, in fact beyond existence and nonexistence as they are 
conventionally understood. This state is difficult to realize, even more dif-
ficult to express in words, and thus in the end of the chapter on nonduality, 
the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa contains a famed passage in which Vimalakīrti, 
when asked about nonduality, responds with silence. A series of statements 
on nonduality, spoken by various bodhisattvas, lead up to this famous 
moment of silence. The final one, spoken by the bodhisattva who “Delights 
in Truth” (Satyanandin), reads:
Truth and deception [form] a duality. The one who sees the truth 
does exactly not consider the truth, so whence will he see any 
deception? For what reason [is that so]? Indeed, he does not see 
with the eye made of flesh (māṃsa): he sees with the eye of insight 
( prajñā). Thus, as he sees, he neither sees, nor does he see beyond, 
and that where there is neither seeing and nor seeing beyond 
(vipaśyanā), that is entry into nonduality.22
In the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, the emptiness of the Pure Lands is thus asserted 
again and again, and it is explained again and again that emptiness refers 
to their mode of being, beyond any duality of existence and nonexistence. 
22 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 8, par. 31): satyaṃ mṛṣeti dvayam etat / satyadarśī satyam eva 
na samanupaśyati / kuto mṛṣā drakṣyati / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / na hi sa māṃsacakṣuṣā paśyati / 
prajñācakṣuṣā paśyati / tathā ca paśyati / yathā na paśyati na vipaśyati / yatra ca na paśyanā 
na vipaśyanāyam advayapraveśaḥ. According to the editors of the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (p. 
89, n. 2), the underlined phrase reads tathā ca paśyati / na viparyasyati in the MS, against the 
Tibetan translation ji ltar mi mthong na rnam par mi mthong (hence Thurman 1976, p. 77: 
“one sees only insofar as there is neither sight nor nonsight”). In accordance with the Tibetan 
version, the editors emend to tathā ca paśyati, yathā na paśyati na vipaśyati. This basically 
conforms to the Chinese version (T no. 475, 14: 551c13–15), which reads: 非肉眼所見慧眼乃
能見而此慧眼無見無不見是為入不二法門 (McRae 2004, p. 164: “That which the physical eye 
cannot see can be seen by the wisdom eye, but this wisdom eye is without seeing and without 
not-seeing. This is to enter the Dharma gate of nonduality”). The mistake was possibly caused 
by the peculiar usage of vipaśyati and vipaśyanā, which should normally be rather positive 
and in accordance with prajñā. Therefore, “he sees and is not in error” (tathā ca paśyati / na 
viparyasyati) seems to be a more commonsensical choice. In fact, it is not so clear whether 
vipaśyati is here intended as the simple opposite/negation of paśyati, or whether it alludes to 
the more contemplative modes of seeing in vipaśyanā meditation. Possibly, a wordplay with 
the double meaning of vi- (expand, dissolve) is implied here.
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This applies equally to both the Pure Lands and the body of the Buddhas. 
The same idea is expressed in the Vajracchedikā, in a passage that reads:
The Bhagavat spoke: Subhūti, if any bodhisattva said, “I will bring 
about arrays (vyūhāḥ) of [pure] fields,” he would speak wrong. 
Why is that so? [What people call] “the arrays of fields, the arrays 
of fields”: these are taught by the Tathāgata to be non-arrays 
(avyūhāḥ).23
While emptiness and nonduality appear as commonplace principles through-
out the literature of Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra,24 we find more 
specific Yogācāra doctrines in Asaṅga’s commentary to the Vajracchedikā:25
Because they are the outcome (niṣyanda)26 of wisdom ( jñāna),
Because they are mere cognition (vijñaptimātrata),
He does not discern (udgraha)27 the [Buddha] fields.
Because they have no shape and because they are supreme,
They are thought to be, by nature, non-array as well as array.28
23 Vajracchedikā, section 10b (my translation); Sanskrit according to Conze 1957, p. 
35: bhagavān āha / yaḥ kaścit subhūte bodhisattva evaṃ vaded / ahaṃ kṣetra-vyūhān 
niṣpādayiṣyāmīti / sa vitathaṃ vadet / tat kasya hetoḥ / kṣetra-vyūhāḥ kṣetra-vyūhā iti subhūte 
’vyūhās te tathāgatena bhāṣitāḥ. Cf. Halkias (2013, pp. 10–11 and p. 220, n. 20).
24 In my usage, “classical Yogācāra” refers to those segments of the Yogācāra tradition 
adhering to the doctrines of ālayavijñāna, the three natures (trisvabhāva), and the view of 
subject and object as mind only (cittamātra). See Bayer 2010, p. 28, n. 67.
25 On this text, see, for example, Nakamura 1980, p. 256. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 12, and p. 
249, n. 149.
26 “Outcome” (niṣyanda) here carries the connotation of an outcome that shares important 
characteristics of its cause (Tucci 1956, p. 63: Ch. version 1, xi 習, version 2, liu 流; Tib. 
rgyu mthun). See also Bayer 2010, p. 343, n. 131. Keenan’s (1989, p. 38) translation, “nothing 
but constructions flowing from wisdom,” accurately renders the metaphorical implication of 
/syand, “flow.”
27 “Discerning” (ud-/grah) usually refers to grasping (/grah) the specific characteristics 
of an item out of (ud-) mere sense data, which is a function of the skandha of apperception 
(saṃjñā). See Bayer 2010, p. 315, n. 41.
28 My translation. Tucci 1956, p. 63, verse 20: jñānaniṣyandavijñaptimātratvāt 
kṣetranodgrahaḥ / avigrahatvād agratvād avyūhavyūhatā matā. Tucci proposes an emenda-
tion to avyūha[ṃ] vyūhatā. While an anusvāra can easily vanish on a manuscript, the com-
pound avyūhavyūhatā goes along well with the Tibetan and Chinese versions. This reading 
would even support Tucci’s translation “the arrangement (vyūha) of these fields is said to be 
essentially a non-arrangement (avyūha)” (p. 103). Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 12.
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Cause and effect described in this reasoning appear to be similar to the pro-
cess described in the Triṃśikā (hereafter, Thirty Verses): first, the nature of 
phenomena is discerned as mere cognition, a realization which then leads to 
the realization of their ultimate nonduality. Unlike the worldly phenomena 
mentioned in the Thirty Verses, phenomena in the Pure Lands are created by 
a Buddha’s wisdom. Asaṅga further describes various attributes of a Pure 
Land in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (hereafter, MSg), for example in the fol-
lowing passage:
It has arisen from supreme, supramundane wholesome roots [ch. 
10, section 30a.5],
It has the characteristics of a sovereign cognition that is eminently 
pure [30a.6],
It is the abode of the Tathāgata [30a.7].29
Further below, Asaṅga explains these three attributes in more abstract terms:
It [has] an exalted cause [30b.5],
It [is] an exalted result [30b.6],
It [has] an exalted master [30b.7].30
The explanations of “exalted cause, result, and master” strongly resemble 
specific Abhidharma explanations on karmic causation, namely the teach-
ings on the “sovereign result” (Skt. adhipati-phala), a kind of karman 
which determines environmental conditions such as the quality of soil or 
rainfall. The term for “master” used in the MSg original was probably San-
skrit adhipati, since the respective terms in Tibetan (bdag po) and Chinese 
(zhu 主) are known as equivalents for adhipati (or otherwise svāmin).31 I 
will say more on the “sovereign result” below when discussing Wonhyo’s 
29 Numbering of the sections according to Nagao 1987, pp. 119–20 (left-to-right pagina-
tion). Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 94: 5. ’jig rten las ’das pa de’i bla ma’i dge ba’i rtsa ba las 
byung ba / 6. dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid / 
7. de bzhin gshegs pa’i gnas (see also Griffiths et al. 1989, pp. 354–55). T no. 1594, 31: 
151a15: 5. 勝出世間善根所起, 6. 最極自在淨識為相, 7. 如來所都. Note that the expression du 
都 means “capital,” at least as a connotation: another indication that a Buddha presides over 
his Pure Land similar to a king presiding over his kingdom.
30 D4048 (fol. ri 41b3), P5549 (fol. li 48b6): 5. rgyu phun sum tshogs pa dang / (D: rgyu 
phun sum tshogs pa dang /; P: omitted) 6. ’bras bu phun sum tshogs pa dang / 7. bdag po 
phun sum tshogs pa (see also Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 94; Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 359). T no. 
1594, 31: 151a26: 因圓滿。果圓滿。主圓滿.
31 Equivalents for adhipatiphala are bdag po’i ’bras bu in Tibetan, and zeng shan guo 增
上果 in the standard terminology of Xuanzang 玄奘 (c. 602–664).
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phrasing. As for the above MSg passage, the aspect of “result” (30b.6.) is 
further deepened in the commentary by Asvabhāva (c. 450–530):
“It has the characteristics of a sovereign cognition that is emi-
nently pure.” This means that [its]32 characteristics are that of an 
eminently pure sovereign cognition,33 because it is cognition only 
(*vijñaptimātra). There are no [wonderful attributes of the Pure 
Land such as] jewels and so on, apart from cognition. Rather, 
cognition itself, because it is completely pure, appears as those 
[jewels and so on]. This explains [the phrase] “it is an excellent 
result.”34
Just like any other world system, including our own, a Pure Land might 
appear as external to the mind, but in fact it is mere cognition, mental pro-
duction, while its true nature lies beyond the polarity of existence or non-
existence. Asaṅga explains this ultimate ontology, for example, in the tenth 
chapter of the MSg, a chapter dedicated to the elucidation of wisdom (Tib. 
ye shes; Skt. *jñāna) as being identical with the three bodies of a Buddha.35 
Concerning the nonduality of the dharmakāya, Asaṅga states:
32 Cp. Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 213: “means that Buddha land is characterized by.” In fact, 
an equivalent to “wei fo jing tu” 謂佛淨土 is missing in the English rendering of the Chinese 
version, and it seems to have been wrongly included in the translation of the Tibetan version. 
Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 12.
33 Cp. Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 213: “masterful and well-purified conscious construction.” 
Although the Pure Lands can of course be described as “masterful,” the translation of dbang 
sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa (Xuanzang: zi zai [jing] shi 自在[淨]識) as “masterful,” in the 
sense of “skillful,” “virtuoso,” is quite clearly a euphemism. The Buddha undoubtedly exerts 
(*vartin) control (*vaśa) over the Pure Land. See, for example, Inagaki 1978, s.v. dbang 
sgyur nyid: “State of a Vaśavartin god, vaśavartiva” (Ch. ta hua zi zai tian wang 他化自在天
王). The Buddha Amitābha was clearly seen as the ruler of his Pure Land, to some extent the 
empyrean equivalent to a worldly king.
34 D4050 (fol. ri 290b7–291a1), P5551 (fol. li 350b4–5): dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa 
shin tu rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid ces bya ba ni de dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin 
tu rnam par dag pa gang yin pa de’i mtshan yid yin te / de rnam par rig pa tsam gyi phyir ro // 
de na rnam par rig pa las gzhan pa’i rin po che la sogs pa med kyi / rnam par rig pa de nyid 
shin tu rnam par dag pas de ltar snang ste / ’dis ni ’bras bu phun sum tshogs pa bstan to // (see 
also Griffiths et al. 1989, pp. 354–55). T no. 1594, 31: 446a17–20: 最極自在淨識為相者。謂佛
淨土最極自在清淨心識以為體相。唯有識故。非離識外別有寶等。即淨心識如是變現似眾寶等。
此句顯示果圓滿.
35 MSg, ch. 10, section 1. D4048 (fol. ri 37a3), P5549 (fol. li 43a4–5): ye shes kyi khyad 
par ji ltar blta bar bya (D: blta bar bya; P: blta) zhe na/ sangs rgyas kyi sku gsum po. See 
also Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 279; Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 83.
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As for the [dharmakāya’s] characteristics of nonduality: Because 
[dharmas have] characteristics of nonduality of existence and 
nonexistence, all dharmas are without existence, and they are the 
existents which have the characteristics of emptiness. Therefore 
[the dharmakāya has the characteristics of nonduality].36
Further below in the same chapter, Asaṅga reaffirms the nonduality of the 
dharmakāya in a verse that reads:
There is no complete bodhi anywhere, and it is not the case that 
everything is without bodhi.37 In every moment it is unfathomable. 
It unfolds the nonexistence of existence.38
The stanza follows a rather cryptic style and leaves much room for inter-
pretation, especially in the absence of the Sanskrit original. Does this verse 
deal with bodhi or more concretely with the Buddha? Both readings are 
possible, yet it seems that even if the original Sanskrit term was buddha, it 
might stand for an abstract principle rather than a concrete person.39 This 
36 MSg, ch. 10, section 3.3. D4048 (fol. ri 37b5–5), P5549 (fol. li 43b8–44a1): gnyis su 
med pa’i mtshan nyid ni yod pa dang med pa gnyis su med pa’i mtshan nyid kyis chos thams 
cad dngos po med pa dang / stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid kyi dngos po yin pa’i phyir ro. See 
also Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 285; Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 84. The logic of the argument is dif-
ficult to follow, and Buddhaśānta’s translation seems slightly mistaken: 不二相事非事二相故。
依一切法非事故。有為無為不二相 (T no. 1592, 31: p. 110a11–12). Xuanzang’s version makes 
the argument more explicit, albeit still with some differences from the Tibetan, stating that the 
“characteristics [insofar as they are] manifestations of emptiness, really exist”: 三無二為相。
謂有無無二為相。由一切法無所有故。空所顯相是實有故。有為無為無二為相 (T no. 1594, 31: 
149b11–13).
37 The most straightforward explanation for this phrase is probably that Buddhas, in a way, 
“exist” even though they have no “real” existence. This is clearly Vasubandhu’s interpretation 
(see Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 340). Nonetheless, in Asvabhāva’s reading, this more abstractly 
expresses that the dependent nature is in a way identical to the perfected nature: thams cad 
sangs rgyas ma yin min // zhes bya ba ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo (D: gi ngo bo; P: de) nyid 
yongs su grub par yod pa’i phyir ro (D4051 ri 287a7, P5552 li 346b5). These two interpre-
tations do not contradict each other, and the MSg author probably expressed himself rather 
ambiguously on purpose.
38 MSg, ch. 10, section 28.3. D4048 (fol. ri 40a3–4), P5549 (fol. li 46b8): gang yang mngon 
rdzogs sangs rgyas med // thams cad sangs rgyas ma yin min // skad cig re la dpag tu med // 
dngos po’i dngos med rab tu phye. See also Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 340; Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, 
p. 91. Xuanzang’s translation: 現等覺非有一切覺非無一一念無量有非有所顯 (T no. 1594, 31: 
150b24–25).
39 Nagao (1987, p. 388) suggests Skt. abhisaṃbuddha for Tib. mngon rdzogs sangs rgyas 
and interprets it as “the matter (/fact) called opening awakening” (悟りを開くということ), that 
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principle is taught to be beyond existence and nonexistence, and possibly 
even to pervade all illusory manifestations of phenomena. Vasubandhu, in 
his comment on this verse, equates this buddha/bodhi, beyond existence and 
nonexistence, with suchness, an interpretation that seems consistent with 
Asaṅga’s original intention:
“It unfolds the nonexistence of existence.” This means: Here, such-
ness (*tathatā) is the nonexistence of existence. What is unfolded 
by that is bodhi/the Buddha. This is the meaning [of this verse].40
Many open questions remain in the interpretation of this and similar pas-
sages of the MSg. The Sanskrit original of this particular passage prob-
ably contained the multifaceted word prabhāvita (“manifested, pervaded, 
characterized”),41 a term that is of central importance for the interpretation 
of cittamātra systematics. Since the exact implications of prabhāvita are 
as yet not affirmatively settled,42 my translation of the above passages can 
only be provisional. Still, it can probably be said that Asaṅga considered the 
dharmakāya to be neither confined to a specific position in space and time, 
nor a mere subjective mental event, but as transcending and even pervading 
the whole of phenomenal existence. While this is undoubtedly an important 
question for the theme of this article, it cannot, unfortunately, be discussed 
in more detail here.43
Asaṅga’s statements about the Pure Lands are thus far from arbitrary 
remarks on a somewhat foreign phenomenon: they are firmly rooted in the 
consistent and complex systematics of the Yogācāra tradition, and they are, as 
far as I see, completely in line with the teachings of the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa. 
is, the action rather than the agent. Similarly, he suggests Skt. buddha for Tib. sangs rgyas in 
the second line and interprets the phrase as “it is not the case that everything (/everybody?) is 
not awakened” (あらゆるものが悟われていないのではない). In his comments, he further pres-
ents his interpretation of Vasubandhu’s commentary to the effect that “everything is the Bud-
dha, everything is ‘awakened’” (すべては仏陀であり“覚された”である, Nagao 1987, p. 389).
40 D4050 (fol. ri 182b5–183a1), P5551 (fol. li 222b3–5): dngos po’i dngos med rab tu 
phye / zhes bya ba ni ’dir de bzhin nyid ni dngos po’i dngos po med pa ste / des rab tu phye 
ba ni sangs rgyas yin no zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go. Xuanzang’s translation: 有非有所顯者。
此顯真如是有非有。諸佛是此真如所顯 (T no. 1597, 31: 374c18–19). See also Griffiths et al. 
1989, p. 340.
41 See Nagao 1987, p. 388.
42 See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 411–18.
43 See also Bayer 2013, pp. 82–90, for the dharmakāya in the context of tantric practices 
relating to Sukhāvatī.
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In the same way, Vasubandhu’s summary of Yogācāra doctrine, the Thirty 
Verses, also culminates in a description of the unthinkable dharmakāya:
The element without inflows (anāsrava),
Is the unthinkable, wholesome, imperishable, joyful Body of Lib-
eration.
It is the so-called [body of]44 the doctrine of the Great Sage.45 
(verse 30)
The “Body of Liberation” (vimuktikāya) is a doctrinal topos known from 
the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra. It designates a state of liberation reached by 
śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and fully awakened Buddhas that is different 
from the dharmakāya, which is reached only by fully awakened buddhas.46 
According to Sthiramati’s commentary on the Thirty Verses, the “Body 
of Liberation” signifies overcoming the obstructions consisting in kleśas 
(kleśāvaraṇa); and, the dharmakāya, in this context, signifies overcom-
ing the obstructions in the way of the things to be known ( jñeyāvaraṇa).47 
The Uttaratantra further states that the “Body of Liberation” represents 
one’s own benefit, and the dharmakāya the benefit of others.48 Still, when it 
comes to the factual qualities of these two bodies, the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-
sūtra propounds that, even though there are significant differences, these 
are hard to describe.49
The gradual path of understanding as outlined in the Thirty Verses culmi-
nates in the attainment of these two bodies, with the dharmakāya being the 
ultimate body of the Tathāgata. One cannot help but notice that this resem-
bles the above-quoted passage in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (ch. 3, par. 45), 
according to which:
44 See Sthiramati’s commentary (Buescher 2007, p. 142): mahāmuner dharmakāya ity ucy-
ate.
45 Buescher 2007, p. 149: sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ / sukho vimuktikāyo 
’sau dharmākhyo ’yaṃ mahāmuneḥ. See also the translation by Frauwallner (2010, p. 417).
46 Chapter 10, section 2, of the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra is probably the earliest source for 
the concept of vimuktikāya. See Buescher 2008, p. 161, n. 2; Schmithausen 2014, p. 354, n. 
1599.
47 See Buescher 2007, p. 142, and Nagao 1991, p. 24.
48 Uttaratantra, ch. 2, verse 30 (Johnston 1950, p. 84). See also Takasaki 1966, pp. 30, 320, 
n. 56, and pp. 322–23; Schmithausen 1971, p. 163; Brunnhölzl 2009, p. 330; Fuchs 2000, p. 
197.
49 See Lamotte 1935, p. 149: de la dpe bya bar yang sla ba ma yin (Saṃdhi-nirmocana-
sūtra, ch. 10, section 2).
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The Tathāgatas have the dharmakāya [as their body]. . . . 
The Tathāgatas have the supramundane body (lokottarakāya) 
because they have completely transcended all mundane dharmas 
(lokadharma). . . . The body of the Buddha is not composed and 
is past (vigata) all verbal designations.50
This ultimate dharmakāya of the Thirty Verses is clearly identical with the 
“highest meaning” according to an earlier verse: 
[One kind of “naturelessness” (niḥsvabhāvatā) results from the 
fact]51
That it [i.e., the perfected nature] is the highest meaning 
( paramārtha) of the factors.
This [perfected nature]52 is also suchness,
Because it is such at all times.53
It is just (eva), mere cognition by nature (vijñaptimātratā).54 (verse 
25)
50 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 3, par. 45): dharmakāyās tathāgatā . . . / lokottarakāyās 
tathāgatāḥ sarvalokadharmasamatikrāntāḥ / . . . asaṃskṛtas tathāgatasya kāyaḥ 
sarvasaṃkhyāvigataḥ.
51 See Thirty Verses, verse 24, in Buescher 2007, p. 149: aparā niḥsvabhāvatā.
52 See Sthiramati’s commentary (ibid., p. 130): pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ paramārtha 
ucyate.
53 The verb bhāva in this context carries quite a bit of significance. Here, it seems not to 
express existence but rather identity in the sense of “serving as” (see Mayrhofer 1992–2001, 
s.v. BHAV). While some of the Tibetan versions translate this as [de bzhin] yod, others read 
[de bzhin] nyid (see Buescher 2007, p. 131, n. 10). The latter could be, at first sight, a simple 
miscorrection of an unwanted reading, but even in this case, it surely points to a significant 
problem, namely that the translation of the commentary on this verse reads dus thams cad 
du de bzhin te / gzhan du ma yin pas de bzhin nyid ces bya’o (ibid., p. 131, my underlining), 
where yin pas is a translation of Skt. bhavati (see ibid., p. 130). Notably, most Tibetan ver-
sions of the verses (kārikāḥ) alone do not fall into the mistake of rendering bhāva as yod, 
while yod is used in the translation (of the verses) in the context of Sthiramati’s commentary. 
One possible explanation for this is that, after the initial translators, later generations tended 
to study the commentary rather than the verses alone, which might have led to a miscorrec-
tion of nyid to yod (or the unmetrical yod pas), while in the kārikās, nyid was left untouched 
(see ibid., 2007, p. 131, n. 10). Tib. nyid is supported by Xuanzang’s translation (T no. 1586, 
31: 61a27): 常(當)如其性故 即唯識實性. See also Watanabe 1995–98, vol. 2, p. 101: 常如の性
であるから; and vol. 1, p. 29: 真如一切時に、そのように有るからである.
54 Buescher 2007, p. 149: dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathatāpi saḥ / sarvakālaṃ 
tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā. See also the translation by Frauwallner (2010, p. 417).
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While it is easy to see how the dharmakāya is identical with “naturelessness” 
(niḥsvabhāvatā), the “highest meaning” ( paramārtha), suchness (tathatā), 
and the perfected nature ( pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ), it might be more diffi-
cult to equate this with the principle (-tā) of mere cognition. Vijñaptimātratā 
is quite clearly the principle that subject and object of perception are both 
mere cognition, a principle that, when rightly understood, leads to the real-
ization of the highest meaning and everything equated with it, in a direct 
perception (abhisamaya), as the commentary puts it.55
Just like the identity of “arrangement” (vyūha) and “non-arrangement” 
(avyūha) in the Vajracchedikā seems paradoxical at first sight, so does 
the equation of “cognition-only(-ness)” (vijñaptimātratā) with the high-
est meaning in the Thirty Verses. This doctrine is elucidated in the section 
following verse 25 of the Thirty Verses: in the process of liberation, dual-
istic grasping cannot disappear as long as “cognition does not rest in the 
principle of mere cognition” (verse 26).56 Although it could seem as if this 
resting of cognition in cognition could be the highest goal, it is not enough 
to simply think that the seemingly material objects of cognition are in reality 
cognition by nature (verse 27). One rests in mere cognition when wisdom 
( jñāna) does not behold of any object, because when there is nothing to 
grasp, the grasping too becomes obsolete (verse 28), and thus the “grasper,” 
the subject of perception, does not arise (commentary to verse 28).57
At the same time, it is also true that cognition, even when manifested as 
subject and object, is thoroughly pervaded by the highest meaning, and vice 
versa.58 In the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra (ch. 8, section 31) for example, this 
principle is phrased in the following way:
Maitreya! In the Mahayana, “teaching the characteristic of empti-
ness” means that the dependent characteristic ( paratantra-lakṣaṇa) 
55 Buescher 2007, p. 132: saiva vijñaptimātratety anena vacanenābhisamaya uktaḥ.
56 Ibid., p. 149: vijñaptimātratve vijñānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate. See also the translation by Frau-
wallner (2010, p. 417).
57 See Buescher 2007, pp. 136–39. To the same effect, Tola and Dragonetti (2004, p. 211, 
commenting on the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, verse 25): “One reaches the knowledge that it is the 
mind and only the mind which creates the beings and things that are perceived, that conse-
quently beings and things exist only with the existence of mental creations, are mere illusions. 
Finally, one acquires the knowledge of the absolute nature: if duality, under which form the 
dependent nature appears, does not exist really, the only ‘entity’ that remains is the inexis-
tence of duality i.e. the absolute nature.” See also Schmithausen 2014, p. 606.
58 See also Tola and Dragonetti 2004, p. 211 (commenting on verse 25 in the 
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa): “The absolute nature is also in the dependent nature.”
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and the perfected characteristic ( pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa) are [by 
nature, Tib. nyid ] completely free of the imagined characteristic 
( parikalpita-lakṣaṇa) concerning both pollution and purification; 
and, that [imagined characteristic] is not made an object [of per-
ception] there [i.e., in the union of the dependent and perfected 
characteristic].59
In contrast to the abovementioned section of the Thirty Verses, this section 
of the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra does not use the expression “the high-
est meaning” ( paramārtha). Nonetheless, from the point of view of later 
commentators, this is seen to be implied, as Jñānagarbha (c. 700–760), for 
example, holds in his commentary on the Maitreya chapter:
It is said [in the sutra]: “that is said to be the condensed character-
istics of emptiness.” [This means the following:] The three natures 
which are condensed in the [two] truths, veiled and highest mean-
ing, are empty. Therefore [the three characteristics] are the con-
densed meaning of emptiness.60
The above sources concordantly assert the emptiness of the Pure Lands, and 
any discord about this question is hardly discernable.61 Whatever disputes 
may have arisen about ontology,62 the ultimately nondual nature, emptiness 
and manifestation inseparable, of Buddha fields just as much as any fac-
59 The Tibetan version reads: byams pa gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid dang / yongs su 
grub paʼi mtshan nyid rnam pa thams cad du kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang 
baʼi kun brtags paʼi mtshan nyid dang shin tu rnam par bral ba nyid dang / de la de [mi] 
dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni theg pa chen po la stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid bstan pa zhes 
bya’o (D774 ca 34b3–4). See also Lamotte 1935, p. 110; Schmithausen 2014, p. 366, n. 1664. 
Cp. T no. 676, 17: 701b14–17: 善男子。若於依他起相及圓成實相中。一切品類雜染清淨。遍計
所執相畢竟遠離性。及於此中都無所得。如是名為於大乘中總空性相. Tib. mi dmigs pa seems to 
stand for anupalambha. See Yokoyama and Hirosawa 1996, s.v. mushotoku 無所得.
60 D4033 bi 337a6–7: de ni theg pa chen po la stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid bsdus pa 
zhes bya’o zhes bya ba ni kun rdzob dang don dam pa’i bden pas bsdus pa’i ngo bo nyid 
gsum stong pa’i phyir stong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid bsdus pa yin no //. Cf. Powers 1992, p. 
190: “[The passage,] ‘the full character of emptiness in the Great Vehicle’ [indicates that] 
because the three natures that are subsumed by the two truths—the conventional and the ulti-
mate—are empty, this includes the character of emptiness.”
61 Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 220, n. 45.
62 See, for example, Schmithausen 2014, p. 401, n. 1774. Inagaki (1998, pp. 49–53) 
describes the Pure Land doctrine of Nāgārjuna. Even though the authenticity of some sources 
ascribed to Nāgārjuna is uncertain, views such as “Buddha and voidness are not different” 
(Inagaki 1998, pp. 50–51) seem to conform to his original tenets.
B AY E R :  E M P T I N E S S  A N D  L I B E R AT I O N 95
tors (dharmas) in our universe was, to my knowledge, undisputed in Indian 
Buddhism.63
Excursus: The Pure Land, A Foreign Element in Buddhism?
Much has been written on a possible Central Asian influence in the forma-
tion of Pure Land culture, and indeed, in the formative period, cultural 
exchange with the successors of the Persian and Macedonian empires 
flourished.64 Therefore, it has almost been taken for granted that this par-
ticular Central Asian cultural blend shaped the imagery and the narratives 
of Sukhāvatī. Snellgrove,65 for example, regards the worship of Buddha 
Amitābha as an alien element within the Buddhism of Asaṅga’s time and 
thinks it probable that it was introduced through the “inherited beliefs of 
some of those Greeks and Scythians and other peoples of the far northwest 
who before their conversion to Buddhism were already aware of another 
great religion centering on Ahura Mazda, the Supreme God of Light.” 
Given this possible origin, Snellgrove interprets the worship of Amitābha as 
a “popular and unorthodox form of Buddhism in that its religious aspiration 
is directed primarily to rebirth in Amitābha’s paradise and thus is largely 
unconcerned with the winning of nirvana, the true goal of early Buddhist 
practitioners, or with cultivating the thought of enlightenment.” Schopen 
also mentions the peculiarity of Sukhāvatī imagery, but rather than dealing 
with its origins, focuses on its spread in Buddhist literature.66
Although a Central Asian influence on the imagery of Amitābha is surely 
possible, or even probable, we find ourselves in a situation in which the 
available evidence does not suffice for retracing such an influence in any 
meaningful sense. In fact, the association of the sky and light with safety and 
salvation could be as old as human culture itself, originating from the real-
life experience of elevated places as a refuge from natural enemies.67 It is 
63 Due to the limitations of this article, several important doctrinal developments cannot be 
taken into account, such as the two kinds of dharmakāya devised by Tanluan 曇鸞 (476–542?; 
see Inagaki 1998, p. 75), or the doxographical scheme of Huiyuan 慧遠 (523–592) in which 
“emptiness” seems to have a somewhat depreciative connotation (see Tanaka 1990, pp. 
32–37). See also ibid., p. 203, n. 22, on the influence of Huiyuan’s thought on Wonhyo, 
whose views will be discussed below.
64 Beckwith (2012) provides an impressive introduction to the cultural exchanges in 
Gandhāra around the time of the Kuṣāna empire.
65 Snellgrove 1987, pp. 55–56.
66 Schopen 1977, pp. 190, 192, 201.
67 See Kilian in Jellen 2011.
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by no means a unique element of Persian religion. The Buddhist conception 
that the gods live in the sky and the preta under the earth probably predates 
the Sukhāvatī literature,68 and even the association of sunset (the west) with 
death is so obvious that it would be difficult to trace its transmission.
Furthermore, the narrative of a pure Buddha land, easier to attain than 
nirvana in this life, fits in well with the Buddhist order’s changing role in 
ancient Indian society and its efforts to engage the laity. It is thus equally 
possible that the Sukhāvatī culture was formed to the south of the Hindu-
kush without any significant influence from the north or west. As will be 
shown below, the availability of such an easily accessible Pure Land does 
not necessarily imply that the ultimate aim of nirvana or Buddhahood is 
abandoned, neither within the texts portraying Sukhāvatī, nor within the 
broader Buddhist culture that carries this complex of beliefs and practices.
Asaṅga’s Views on the Soteriological Value of Pure Lands
There is probably no part of the Mahayana tradition that has not been influ-
enced by Asaṅga’s seminal works on Buddhist systematics in one way or 
another. Asaṅga is one of the first, and definitely the most influential, schol-
ars who sought to systematize the doctrines of the Mahayana sutras into 
a coherent, presentable, and defendable whole. The most challenging part 
of this undertaking was surely the harmonization of statements in different 
sutras that seem to contradict each other. An effective exegetical method was 
devised: namely, identifying such statements as spoken with a “covert inten-
tion,” made-to-measure for a specific audience, and not to be taken literally.69
This exegetical device is probably best known from the Saṃdhi-
nirmocana-sūtra as the teaching of the “three turnings of the Dharma 
wheel.” Although it gained wide recognition, some traditions were naturally 
not willing to accept that the āgama sutras were only spoken to people with 
a lesser capacity, or that statements such as “there is no matter, feeling, 
apperception . . . ” were to be taken less literally than they appear in the 
prajñāpāramitā sutras. The East Asian tradition mostly followed Xuan-
zang’s acceptance of the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra and Asaṅga’s system-
68 I therefore follow Gómez (1996, pp. 35–36), who dismisses the sutra's light imagery as 
sufficient evidence for Central Asian influence, pointing to the topos of divine light in vari-
ous parts of the Buddhist tradition. These occurrences are also adduced by Harvey (2013, p. 
173), who makes no mention of possible Central Asian influence. Cf. Halkias 2013, pp. 22, 
227. In the āgama sutras, the Buddha quite naturally recommends to laypeople a course of 
action that leads to rebirth in heaven (Skt. svarga), as a motivation to eventually enter the 
path towards nirvana. See Harvey 2013, p. 48. 
69 See also Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.vv. abhiprāya, abhisaṃdhi.
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atics, so that the fervent critiques by Candrakīrti (c. 600–650) remained 
unheard. On the other hand, Asaṅga’s approach to Sukhāvatī doctrines 
became a much disputed matter. In these two points, the East Asian stan-
dard position reversely mirrors the Tibetan mainstream in which Candrakīrti 
is defended with great fervor, while the ten recollections of Amitābha (see 
below) never gained much prominence.70
A first look at Asaṅga’s systematization could lead to the impression that 
he held the Pure Land doctrines in rather low esteem,71 and therefore, it 
seems appropriate to disregard secondary sources and later interpretations 
for the moment and take a direct look, once again, at his writings. In the 
second chapter of the MSg,72 Asaṅga presents a doctrine of four “intentions” 
(abhiprāya) of the Buddha, that is, four different intentions underlying dif-
ferent sections of the Buddha’s teachings.73 Among those, the second kind 
of intention concerns the Pure Land teachings:
[The second kind of intention,] “intention for another time,” means 
the following: [statements such as,] “by grasping only the name of 
the Buddha ‘Many Jewels’ (Bahuratna),74 one will be established 
in the right, complete awakening” etc., or, “by only making a sol-
emn wish,75 one will be reborn in the world of Sukhāvatī, just as it 
was spoken [by the Buddha].”76
70 See also Bayer 2013, p. 83, n. 23.
71 See Tanaka 1990, pp. 12–13. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 19.
72 On the textual situation, see Griffiths et al. 1989, p. xv, and Nakamura 1980, p. 264, where 
the available versions of the MSg and its commentaries are listed.
73 See Tanaka 1990, p. 223, n. 47.
74 It is unclear to which sutra the name Bahuratna alludes, even though the name is similar 
to Prabhūta-ratna in the Lotus Sutra. See Nagao 1982, p. 392, n. 3.
75 The translation “solemn wish” for praṇidhāna is used provisionally for lack of a better 
term. Some of the related problems are addressed in Edgerton 1953, vol. 2, s.vv. praṇidadhāti, 
praṇidhāna, praṇidhyeti. See also Gómez 1996, p. 224, n. 7.
76 MSg, ch. 2, section 31.2. D4048 (fol. ri 20b5–6), P5549 (fol. li 23b2–4): dus gzhan la 
dgongs pa ni ’di lta ste / de bzhin gshegs pa rin chen mang gi mtshan bzung (D: bzung; P: 
gzung) bas bla na med pa (D: pa; P: par) yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu nges par 
’gyur ro zhes bya ba lta bu dang smon lam btab pa tsam gyis ’jig rten gyi khams bde ba can 
du skye bar ’gyur ro zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu’o (see also Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 41). 
Sanskrit parallels in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra-bhāṣya according to Lamotte 1938, vol. 
2, p. 130: [bahuratnasya {added by Lamotte}] tathāgatasya nāmadheyagrahaṇamātreṇa 
niyato bhavaty anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodh[au], (Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 24), and ye 
sukhāvatyāṃ praṇidhānaṃ kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyante, (Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 4–5). Cp. T 
no. 1592, 31: 103b16–19: 二者時節意趣。所謂若稱多寶如來名者。即定於阿耨多羅三藐三菩
提。如無量壽經 。若有眾生願取無量壽世界即生爾 (my underlines). See also Tanaka 1990, p. 
210, n. 63. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 19.
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So far, this section of the MSg contains nothing that would belittle Pure 
Lands explicitly, let alone belittle them as being a token for the “spiritually 
inferior” or “morally indolent.” Nonetheless, we do find the word “lazi-
ness” (kauśīdya) in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra, which is a verse text 
generally held to be either composed by Asaṅga himself, or written down 
by him as dictated by his teacher. In chapter 12, verse 18 of the Mahāyāna-
sūtra-alaṃkāra, the four kinds of “intention” are listed briefly, very much 
in agreement with the MSg. It is in the following verse (12.19) that the term 
“laziness” appears. The passage reads:
The four kinds of intention are intended [to refer to: 1.] sameness, 
[2.] another meaning. Likewise [3.] another time,77 [4.] and again, 
the disposition of a living being.78 (ch. 12, verse 18)
A low opinion [1.] with regard to the Buddha and [2.] the Dharma, 
[3.] laziness, [4.] being content with only little, [5.] acting in pas-
sion or [6.] haughtiness, [7.] remorse, and [8.] separation out of 
indecision.79 (ch. 12, verse 19)
Thus, verse 19 contains a list of attitudes that hinder a wholehearted pursuit 
of the Dharma. Among them, “laziness” is the third one. In the verses them-
selves, it is not made clear that the first four obstructing attitudes are neces-
sarily related, respectively, to the first four “intentions” listed in verse 18. 
At this point, we have to consider the prose commentary on the Mahāyāna-
sūtra-alaṃkāra, ascribed to Vasubandhu, which firstly explains the four 
intentions of verse 18 without any mention of laziness.80 It is only in Vasu-
bandhu’s explanation on verse 19 that he presents examples for each of 
those shortcomings that obstruct the aspirant following the Buddhist path. 
About the obstruction of “laziness” [3.], the commentary states:
An explanation [of the Buddha] that counteracts the obstruction 
of laziness: “Those who make a solemn wish ( praṇidhāna) for 
Sukhāvatī will be reborn there.” And, “By grasping only the name 
77 “Another time” appears here as the third item, as different from the MSg where it stands 
in the second position.
78 Lévi 1907, p. 82, l. 27–28: samatārthāntare jñeyas tathā kālāntare punaḥ / pudgalasyāśaye 
caiva abhiprāyaś caturvidhaḥ. See also Thurman 2004, p. 161.
79 Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 8–9: buddhe dharme ’vajñā kauśīdyaṃ tuṣṭir alpamātreṇa /rāge māne 
caritaṃ kaukṛtyaṃ cāniyatabhedaḥ. See also Thurman 2004, p. 162.
80 Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 4–5: kālāntarābhiprāyo yadāha / ye sukhāvatyāṃ praṇidhānaṃ 
kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyanta iti kālāntareṇety abhiprāyaḥ. See also Thurman 2004, p. 161.
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of the Tathāgata Unstained Moonlight they will be settled in right, 
complete awakening.”81
It is thus not absolutely certain that the author of the Mahāyāna-sūtra-
alaṃkāra had the Pure Land teachings in mind when mentioning “laziness.” 
Furthermore, even in Vasubandhu’s commentary on verse 19, “laziness” is 
surely the only fault that is remedied by the teaching of the Pure Lands, but 
this is not necessarily a kind of inferiority or a moral shortcoming. As Tanaka 
(1990, p. 210, n. 64) has noted,82 Vasubandhu applies this understanding in 
his commentary on the MSg, too:
“Thinking of another time” [means] those with a lot of laziness 
are made to apply themselves to the Dharma by means of this 
kind of method. “[Just by] grasping the name of the Tathāgata 
Many Jewels,” [that is to say, just] because of the wholesome 
root (*kuśalamūla) arising from that, this becomes the cause for 
those [people] to attain excellence (Tib. khyad par). It is only that 
[meaning] which [the Buddha] intended [when he spoke the sutra], 
while [in actuality], by only just grasping the name, one will not 
enter into being settled [there],83 and one will not attain unsur-
passable awakening. [It is] just like when one says “one copper 
coin (*paṇa) will become a thousand copper coins,” this means 
“one day,” or “at another time”; [it means that] only one copper 
coin will become the cause of a thousand copper coins.84 Also [the 
81 Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 22–25: kauśīdyāvaraṇasya pratipakṣasaṃbhāṣā / ye sukhāvatyāṃ 
praṇidhānaṃ kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyanta iti / vimalacandraprabhasya ca tathāgatasya 
nāmadheyagrahaṇamātreṇa niyato bhavaty anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhāviti. See also 
Thurman 2004, p. 162.
82 Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 225, n. 94.
83 Cf. Nagao 1982, p. 391, n. 1: “becoming decisive/determined” (Jp. “ketteiteki to naru” 
決定的となる).
84 Vasubandhu’s simile of coins must of course be seen in the context of the theory of “seeds” 
(bīja) of good and bad action, ripening subconsciously. While the “seed” metaphor was in use 
long before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the two were probably the first Abhidharma scholars to 
provide it with a thorough theoretical foundation. In analogy to agricultural seeds, the “seeds” 
in the mind were not only said to mature at a certain point in time, they were also assumed to 
grow or increase (vṛdh, see Bayer 2010, pp. 148, 338). It would therefore not be far-fetched 
to consider that Vasubandhu had an interest-bearing fund in mind (on such funds, see Scho-
pen 1994). Nonetheless, more probably, he seems to allude to a common saying to the effect 
that several small amounts of money add up to a huge sum. Nagao (1982, p. 391, n. 1) clearly 
understands it in this sense. See also T no. 1596, 31: 292b1: 豈一日得耶, “how could one 
possibly obtain [a thousand cents in] a single day!”
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teaching], “one will be born in the Sukhāvatī world realm only by 
making a solemn wish” has to be seen in the same way.85
It must be noted that in Abhidharma terminology, a “wholesome root” is 
both wholesome in itself as well as a root of wholesome action. Strictly 
speaking, it refers to the attitude, or character feature, underlying a whole-
some action (such as the opposites of greed, hatred, and delusion—i.e., 
alobha, adveśa, amoha), rather than the karmically effective act itself, 
even though the term can be used in the latter sense.86 The corresponding 
phrase in the Chinese translation by Paramārtha (499–569) is ambiguous: 
its most natural reading is probably “those who are indolent in their whole-
some roots, by reciting and holding the name of the Buddha Many Jewels, 
will progress to exalted (shangpin 上品) qualities (/the qualities of a noble 
person).”87 It seems that Paramārtha’s translation of the passage played an 
important role in the understanding of the issue in East Asia. The ambivalent 
compound of “indolent” and “wholesome roots” (landuo shangen 懶惰善根) 
is probably the term that made this appear like a moral condemnation. Xuan-
zang, in contrast, speaks only of “those who are indolent in terms of interest 
and vigor.”88 Possibly, the passage was later even understood to imply that 
85 D4050 (fol. ri 154a2–4), P5551 (fol. li 184b1–4): dus gzhan la dgongs pa zhes bya ba la / 
gang snyom las mang ba rnams thabs kyi rnam pa ’di nyid kyis chos ’di la sbyor bar byed 
pa yin te / de bzhin gshegs pa rin chen mang gi mtshan bzung ba’i rgyu las byung ba’i dge 
ba’i rtsa bas de dag khyad par thob pa’i rgyur ’gyur ba tsam la dgongs nas yin gyi mtshan 
bzung ba tsam nyid kyis nges pa la ’jug par ’gyur zhing / bla na med pa’i byang chub ’thob (P: 
’thob; D: thob) pa ma yin te / ji ltar pa ṇa (D: ṇa; P: na) gcig pa ṇa (D: pa ṇa; P: omitted) 
stong du bsgyur (P: bsgyur; D: sgyur) zhes brjod pa de ni nyi ma gcig gis sam / dus gzhan 
du zhes bya ba’i don te / pa ṇa (D: ṇa; P: na) gcig po de nyid pa ṇa (D: ṇa; P: na) stong gi 
rgyur gyur pa bzhin no // smon lam btab pa tsam gyis ’jig rten gyi khams bde ba can du skye 
bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba yang de bzhin du blta bar bya’o //. T no. 1595, 31: 194a26–b7: 論
曰。二別時意。釋曰。若有眾生由懶惰障不樂勤修行。如來以方便 。由此道理於如來正法中。
能勤修行方便 者。論曰。譬如有 。若人誦持多寶佛名。決定於無上菩提不更退墮。釋曰。是
懶惰善根。以誦持多寶佛名。為進上品功德。佛意為顯上品功德。於淺行中欲令捨懶惰勤修道。
不由唯誦佛名。即不退墮決定得無上菩提。譬如由一金錢營覓得千金錢。非一日得千。由別時
得千。如來意亦爾。此一金錢為千金錢因。誦持佛名亦爾。為不退墮菩提因. 
86 See Bayer 2010, pp. 321–22, n. 47.
87 T no. 1595, 31: 194b1–2: 是懶惰善根。以誦持多寶佛名。為進上品功德.
88 T no. 1597, 31: 346b4–7: [別時意趣者。謂此意]趣令嬾惰者。[由彼彼因於彼彼法精勤修習。
彼彼善根皆得增長。此中意趣顯誦多寶如來名因。是昇進因]. Unfortunately, Lamotte (1938, 
vol. 2, p. 130) translates only a summary which is in fact found further above in Xuanzang’s 
version (T no. 1597, 31: 346a10–13: 二別時意趣。謂如 言若誦多寶如來名者。便於無上正等
菩提已得決定。又如 言由唯發願便得往生極樂世界). See also Nagao 1982, p. 389.
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those “indolent” people were not yet “exalted/noble” but the opposite of 
that.89
Leaving Paramārtha’s problematic terminology aside, neither Asaṅga nor 
Vasubandhu engages in a moralistic disqualification of those for whom the 
Buddha spoke the Pure Land teachings. Vasubandhu’s association of Pure 
Land teachings with laziness probably matches the original intention of 
the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra, and his understanding might go back to oral 
instructions he received from his brother Asaṅga.90 Still, Vasubandhu’s explic-
itness may also be an expression of a certain inflexibility he brought with him 
as an exalted Sarvāstivāda scholar. A comparison of his Abhidharma-kośa-
bhāṣya with Asaṅga’s Abhidharma-samuccaya shows that Vasubandhu con-
fronts his opponents, using no uncertain terms, and engages them in lengthy 
fictional debates. Asaṅga, on the other hand, often moves around controver-
sial issues with great flexibility.91
It was, nonetheless, not the mention of “laziness” that became the main 
object of contention in later East Asian debates, but rather the exact impli-
cations of the term “intention for another time” (bie shi yi qu 別時意趣).92 
89 The later Pure Land commentaries developed a complex scheme of nine ranks in which 
people are reborn in Sukhāvatī, each characterized by being either inferior (Ch. xiapin 下品), 
middling (Ch. zhongpin 中品), or supreme (/exalted, noble, Ch. shangpin 上品). See Naka-
mura 2001, s.v. kuhon 九品.
90 The authorship of the bhāṣya is not certain, and ascribed variously to Asaṅga, Vasu-
bandhu, and a certain Vyavavadāta-samaya (Griffiths 1990, p. 45). Here, it is hypothetically 
assumed that Vasubandhu wrote down the commentary in accordance with oral instructions 
by Asaṅga. Given the scarcity of reliable evidence, this assumption comes with no claim of 
certainty. The tradition of arranging and publishing oral instructions often complicates the 
ascription of a specific author to a specific text. See Bayer 2010, p. 18.
91 See Bayer 2010, p. 16. The identity of Asaṅga’s (half-)brother with the author of the 
Abhidharma-kośa is still an unsettled issue. As Sakuma (2013, p. 356) records, Lambert 
Schmithausen has recently pointed out that the technical term “specific transformation of the 
mental continuum” (saṃtati pariṇāmaviśeṣa) can be found not only in those works that hith-
erto seemed closer to the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya, but also, for example, in Vasubandhu’s 
commentary on the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra (Lévi 1907, p. 122, l. 21). In my opinion, the 
burden of proof has thus shifted to those who uphold that these texts were written by two 
different persons. See Schmithausen 2014, p. 27, n. 53. 
92 See Tanaka 1990, p. 44. Gyōnen 凝然 (1240–1321) provides a conciliatory view on these 
debates and their Indian roots in his Jōdo hōmon genru shō 浄土法門源流章 (Dharma Gate to 
the Pure Land: A Section on Sources and Transmissions), translated by Blum (2002). Blum 
has added a wealth of explanations and references to Gyōnen’s remarks on Asaṅga and Vasu-
bandhu (pp. 167–77), and his book is warmly recommended as an introduction to this theme. 
Hayashi 2006 (esp. p. 107) outlines one of the earliest East Asian interpretations of “intention 
for another time” in the writings of Xuanzang’s disciple Ji 基 (632–682).
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Buswell and Lopez (2013, s.v. abhiprāya) interpret these doctrines in the 
following way: “For example, [the Buddha] may assure lazy persons who 
are incapable of any virtuous practice whatsoever that they will be reborn in 
Sukhāvatī, the paradise of Amitābha, if they will simply call on that Buddha. 
He does this in order to encourage them to accumulate a modest amount of 
merit, although he knows that they will not be reborn there immediately or 
even in their next lifetime, but at some other time in the future.” The ambi-
guity in Buswell and Lopez’s paraphrase (“immediately or even in their 
next lifetime”) amply reflects the obscurity of the original texts: it is very 
well possible that Vasubandhu here simply clears up the misunderstanding 
that, just by grasping the name “Many Jewels,” one will in that very moment 
become a perfect Buddha. In the same way, it is at least possible that Asaṅga 
wanted to preclude an all-too-literal understanding of the sutra passages that 
claim that a solemn wish will bring about rebirth in Sukhāvatī: Although this 
wish will eventually be fulfilled, this will not happen at that very moment, 
but only “at a later time,” namely after the end of this life. The available 
comments of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are thus somewhat ambiguous, and 
in fact, the longer Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra (Ch. Wuliangshou jing 無量壽經; 
T no. 360; hereafter, Longer Sutra) itself is ambiguous as far as the mere 
longing for Sukhāvatī is concerned. Does mere longing really suffice, or are 
the generation of bodhicitta and the ten moments of recollecting the Buddha 
Amitābha necessary prerequisites, too? The issue will be discussed in more 
detail below, in the context of Wonhyo’s commentaries.
So far, one may wonder whether the ambiguity of the Indian exegetes could 
have been intentional. They were not only dealing with the theoretical ques-
tion of what is factually true and systematically coherent about the Mahayana 
sutras, even though this is the apparent purpose of the MSg and related texts. 
As a subtext, these works deal with the question of what their readers should 
teach after completing their studies, when fulfilling their duties as educated 
monks. Asaṅga seems to suggest that it is legitimate to follow the example 
of the Buddha and propound edifying doctrines appropriate to the audience, 
with lesser regard for the question of whether they were meant to be liter-
ally true. Asaṅga leaves it open whether “a later time” means the very next 
lifetime or a later one, and it was probably the reader’s choice to teach one 
or the other, depending on the occasion.
What, then, was Asaṅga’s overall judgment of the Pure Land doctrines? 
As Tanaka (1990, p. 13) notes, “a Pure Land commentarial tradition in India 
was virtually nonexistent,” and accordingly we find “little solid evidence 
of active scholarship on Pure Land doctrine in India.” Asaṅga’s endeavors 
can only be understood when seen in this cultural context. One of Asaṅga’s 
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main undertakings was a unification, or a reconciliation, of different Bud-
dhist groups, probably at a point in history when the Gupta dynasty unified 
formerly-warring kingdoms in the north and south of India. Parts of his 
Abhidharma-samuccaya, for example, can be seen as a very smooth, uncon-
troversial introduction to doctrines that were vigorously debated by others.93
Although the Abhidharma-samuccaya is understood in both the Tibetan 
and the East Asian traditions as a Mahayana Abhidharma, and rightly so, 
it mostly rests on the scriptural authority of the pre-Mahayanist sutras. 
This is, since its beginning, just what Abhidharma is: a systematization of 
the thought to be found in the revelation of the sutras. While many non-
Mahayanist traditions had their own Abhidharma, Asaṅga worked not only 
towards the unification of “āgamic” Abhidharma doctrines, but also towards 
the creation of a Mahayana Abhidharma, a systematization of the thought 
found in the extensive Mahayana sutras. This was surely an arduous under-
taking, especially at a time when new Mahayana sutras kept appearing.
With this underlying motivation, his doctrine that the Pure Land teach-
ings are aimed “at a later time” appears in quite a different light. In the 
MSg and the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra, the author attempts to harmonize 
different Mahayana sutras, even if their doctrines appear to be contradic-
tory. In contemporary scholarship, it is, as far as I see, undisputed that 
the Pure Land doctrines do present an option to follow the full Eightfold 
Path not in this lifetime, but in an afterlife, in a world free of concerns for 
offspring, food, and shelter. That is to say: if teachings are classified as 
enabling spiritual attainment “at a later time,” this does not imply any value 
judgment. Furthermore, even if Vasubandhu recommends these teachings 
in order to counteract “laziness,” this does not imply, inversely, that all 
those who aspire to be reborn in the Pure Land are necessarily lazy. This is 
made evident, for example, in the Longer Sutra, where even the Bodhisat-
tva Maitreya is advised to strive for the Pure Land,94 and there is no indica-
tion that Vasubandhu took a radically different stance.
With his systematization of Mahayana materials, Asaṅga quite surely did 
more to promote Pure Land teachings than he did to criticize them.95 In 
93 See Bayer 2012, p. 219.
94 See Gómez (1996, p. 106): “Therefore, Ajita, bodhisattvas who are free from doubts 
should generate this aspiration to attain awakening. And, in order to obtain quickly the capac-
ity to confer benefit and happiness on all living beings, they should dedicate their roots of 
merit to rebirth in the Land of Bliss.” Ashikaga 1965, p. 60: tasmāt tarhy ajita; bodhi sattvair 
nir vicikitsair bodhāya cittam ut pādya, kṣipraṃ sarva sattva hita sukhādhānāya sām arthāprati-
lambhārthaṃ, sukhāvat yāṃ loka dhātāv upa pattaye kuśala mūlāni pari ṇāma yitavyāni.
95 See also Inagaki 1998, p. 39.
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order to fully understand this, it might be helpful for us to imagine his situ-
ation at a time in which no systematic reflections on the Mahayana sutras 
existed. If we take the stance of a person trying to create unified Mahayana 
systematics, based on the Mahayana sutras available at the time, how would 
we go about it? How do the doctrines of the Pure Lands fit into the grander 
whole? It seems Asaṅga found the best possible solution, integrating the 
Pure Land doctrines in a system in which no one sutra is discarded in favor 
of another.96 Rather than depreciating the Pure Land doctrines, he provided 
them with a theoretical foundation. Quite surely, the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha 
is mostly known as an outline of Yogācāra systematics. And yet, a reader 
expecting only an outline of the three natures and the ālayavijña will be 
surprised by how much importance is attributed to the Pure Lands, and how 
thoroughly and favorably they are discussed.
Wonhyo on the Ontology of Sukhāvatī
There is hardly any need to introduce Wonhyo, a pivotal figure in the devel-
opment of Buddhist thought in “East Asia,” or, in other words, in the cultural 
sphere using Han 漢 characters (Jp. kanji bunka ken 漢字文化圈).97 Although 
the authorship of the works attributed to him may not be clear in all cases,98 
Wonhyo’s importance in propagating the doctrines of the Sukhāvatī sutras 
is widely acknowledged.99 Unlike Asaṅga, Wonhyo’s high esteem for these 
doctrines and practices has, to my knowledge, never been questioned.
Remarkably, when reading Wonhyo’s commentaries, we do not have to 
engage in a prolonged search for answers to the questions that concern us 
most: the substratum of Sukhāvatī (or absence thereof ), and the relation of 
Sukhāvatī to the Buddhist paths outlined in other sutras. Wonhyo addresses 
these two questions in prominent position, in the prolegomenon to his com-
mentary on the shorter Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra (Ch. Amituo jing 阿彌陀經; 
96 The four intentions are mentioned in the Vaipulya section of the Abhidharma-samuccaya 
(Gokhale 1947, p. 35, l. 21–22), where it is made explicit that these intentions are a special fea-
ture of some of the Vaipulya (=Mahayana) scriptures. The respective explanations on “another 
time” in the Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya (Tatia 1976, p. 1, l. 1–4, §134) almost literally 
match Vasubandhu’s Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra commentary. See also Nagao 1982, p. 391, n. 1.
97 On the problematic terminology for defining this cultural realm, see Buswell 1998 and 
2011.
98 See Tanaka 1990, p. 206, n. 10, referring to the Yūshin anraku dō 遊心安樂道 (T no. 
1965, vol. 47), attributed to Wonhyo. On the authorship of the Yūshin anraku dō, see, for 
example, Etani 1974.
99 See, for example, Gyōnen’s recognition of Wonhyo and the corresponding remarks by 
Blum (2002, p. 192, n. 39).
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T no. 366; hereafter, Shorter Sutra). That is to say, at the very outset of his 
commentary, the Bulseol amitagyeong so 佛 阿彌陀經疏  (Annotations on 
the Amitābha Sutra Spoken by the Buddha; T no. 1759), Wonhyo goes in 
medias res and mentions not the Buddha Amitābha or the Pure Lands, but 
the mind of ordinary sentient beings. This is followed by remarks on its 
freedom from signs (Ch. xiang 相; Skt. *nimitta) and its emptiness:
The mind of sentient beings, [that] is what is “mind”!100 It is free 
from signs, free from a nature, like the ocean, like empty [space].101
Wonhyo outlines these fundamental truths, stressing the immediacy of the 
highest truth in the mind of ordinary beings, before alluding to the location 
of Sukhāvatī:
Because it is like space, there are no signs which it does not per-
vade. How could there be a place such as east or west? Because it 
is like the ocean, it preserves no nature.102
In other words, there are no appearances in the world that are not pervaded 
by emptiness, the ultimate nature of mind.103 Although the meaning of 
Wonhyo’s dense phrases is at times difficult to grasp, the introduction to his 
commentary on the Longer Sutra (K. Yanggwon muryangsu gyeong jongyo 
兩卷無量壽經宗要; Inherited Essentials of the Two-Volume Sutra of Infinite 
Life; T no. 1747)104 fortunately provides important clues to his commentary 
on the Shorter Sutra. The Longer Sutra commentary is almost identical, but 
written in a smoother, less dramatic, and more understandable style. Here, 
we find the same idea as in the above-quoted passage, but phrased as “the 
nature of mind of sentient beings pervades and penetrates [everything] with-
out obstructions. It is as great as empty space.”105 Furthermore, according 
100 For the Taishō reading “[that] is what is mind!” (K. wi sim ya 為心也), Muller (2012, p. 
215, n. 4) records an alternative reading in a 1989 edition of Wonhyo’s works, namely “[that] 
is the stage/ground of mind” (K. wi sim ji 為心地). With some uncertainty, I follow his accept-
ing the Taishō reading. Possibly, a later scribe or editor expected a more Abhidharma-like term 
instead of Wonhyo’s nontechnical way of expression.
101 T no. 1759, 37: 348a11–12: 夫眾生心之為心也。離相離性如海如空. See also the edition 
and translation in Muller 2012, p. 215.
102 T no. 1759, 37: 348a12–14: 如空之故無相不融。何有東西之處。如海之故無性是守.
103 Cp. Muller 2012, p. 215: “There are no marks that are not subsumed within it.” The 
problematic term here is yung 融, “melting, blending,” but also “including, subsuming.”
104 The term jongyo 宗要 is only provisionally translated as “inhereted essentials,” due to the 
multifaceted meanings of jong 宗 (ancestor, clan, tradition).
105 T no. 1747, 37: 125c1–2: 夫眾生心性融通無礙。泰若虛空.
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to the commentary on the Shorter Sutra, the mind of sentient beings, when 
rightly understood, preserves no nature, like a creek flowing down a moun-
tain; water preserves no specific shape when in motion.106
Embedded in Wonhyo’s introduction to the Shorter Sutra commentary, 
we find a sweeping statement about the absence of absolute locations, in 
empty space, in the mind of beings, and therefore, it seems, in the universe. 
This implies denying that Sukhāvatī can be in the western direction in an 
absolutely real sense, an implication which fits in well with Wonhyo’s 
overall emphasis on the truth beyond all distinctions.107 At the same time, 
it could also indicate that Wonhyo was under the influence of a spherical-
earth theory, or even a heliocentric theory, in which “the West” cannot 
function as a cosmological constant anymore. Notably, Wonhyo deals with 
all these concepts without having even mentioned Sukhāvatī yet.
Although it is thus clear that Wonhyo considers the Pure Land to tran-
scend a specific location in a certain way, this does not necessarily imply 
that he categorically denies that the Pure Land exists in a specific location. 
These two assumptions need not be mutually exclusive.108 At any rate, 
Wonhyo continues his introduction to the Shorter Sutra commentary by 
saying:
How could there not be a time when it gets into motion or calms 
down?109 It sometimes flows out widely, caused by defilement, 
followed by karma and the five turbidities.110 Or, consecutively, 
[due to] purification [as a] condition, the four torrents are inter-
rupted and there is serenity for a long time. All this movement 
106 See also T no. 1747, 37: 125c4: 能隨緣而不逆 (“it follows conditions and does not go 
against [them]”).
107 See, for example, T no. 1747, 37: 125c3, and T no. 1965, 47: 110b18: 何有淨穢之處 (“How 
could there be a place for purification or pollution?”).
108 On the question whether Sukhāvatī exists in a specific location, or rather in the mind, see 
Tanaka 1987, p. 36. Tanaka designates the two possible positions as “subjective” and “objec-
tive.” Some remarks on the Tibetan tradition can be found in Bayer 2013, pp. 86, 87, 93.
109 See also Muller 2012, p. 141: “How could it not have moments of movement or still-
ness?”
110 T no. 1759, 37: 348a14–15: 豈無動靜之時。爾乃或因染業隨五濁而長流. This sentence 
contains allusions to the major factors of defilement in Buddhist doctrine: defiling factors (K. 
yeom 染; Skt. saṃkleśa), karman (eop 業), latencies (su 隨; anuśaya), the five turbidities (tak 
濁; kaṣāya), and the torrents ( yu 流; ogha), all embedded in the metaphor of a wave flowing 
out from the ocean. The syntax of the phrase is difficult to ascertain, but it seems to present 
a causal chain of origination, from basic defilements to actions, the karmic residues of which 
bring about life in a troubled world.
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and calm is a great dream! Based on awakening (K. gak 覺), is the 
view of neither flowing nor serenity.111
Turbulent defilement and calm purification: both are based on the same 
great ocean, mind and emptiness in union. This imagery clearly expresses 
the same meaning as the section of Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra quoted 
above:
“Teaching the characteristic of emptiness” means that the dependent 
characteristic ( paratantra-lakṣaṇa) and the perfected characteristic 
( pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa) are [by nature, Tib. nyid ] completely free 
of the imagined characteristic ( parikalpita-lakṣaṇa) concerning 
both pollution and purification. (ch. 8, section 31)
Wonhyo basically follows the usual four-syllable-structure, and in this passage, 
his commentary almost reads like a kind of poetry in eight-syllable verse:
The polluted earth and the Pure Land
Originate from One Mind.
Birth and death [i.e., samsara] and nirvana
Are ultimately not two sides.
Yet,
Awakening towards nonduality,
Is difficult to attain rightly.
The single dream of delusion,
Is not easy to surpass.112
As Fuji (1997, p. 262) has shown, these descriptions of nonduality can be 
directly traced to the MSg (ch. 2, section 30):
111 T no. 1759, 37: 348a15–16: 或承淨緣。 四流而永寂。若斯動靜皆是大夢。以覺望之 無
流無寂. The syntax of jeong yeon 淨緣 is problematic, especially since this duo seems to play 
the antagonist role to in yeom 因染. Either conditions (=dharmas) are purified, or purified 
dharmas (i.e, the anāsrava-dharmas) become the condition. In effect, this would not make a 
major difference, and either way, it is the cause for the interruption or cutting off of the four 
torrents (desire, existence, ignorance, wrong views).
112 T no. 1759, 37: 348a16–18: 穢土淨國本來一心生死涅槃終無二際然無二之覺取之良難迷一
之夢去之不易. Unfortunately, the parallelism of 無二之覺 and 迷一之夢 is not easily rendered 
appropriately in English. Furthermore, the phrase mu i ji gak 無二之覺 would more liter-
ally be rendered into English as “understanding of nonduality,” with the term gak 覺 having 
a double meaning of “understanding” and “waking up [from sleep]” (akin to Skt. bodhi). 
Since the metaphor of dream and awakening seems to prevail here, the genitive ji 之 is freely 
translated as “towards.”
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What is originally peace, what is originally not peace, and the non-
duality [of those];
What is naturally completely annihilated [i.e., naturally in a state 
of parinirvāṇa],113 what is naturally not completely annihi-
lated, and the nonduality [of those]; 
And again, samsara, nirvana, and the nonduality [of those];
Through these and other classifications (*prabheda),
The Fortunate Ones, the Buddhas, have taught all their hidden 
intentions (*saṃdhāya),114 [as] paradigms (*paryāya)115 such 
as permanent, impermanent, and so on.
In the same way, those [polarities] have to be understood as being 
the three natures.116
Thus Wonhyo, in the above passage from his Shorter Sutra commentary, 
demonstrably follows classical Yogācāra thought as far as nondualism is 
concerned. Still, he goes beyond the doctrines of the MSg-related texts 
113 The original Sanskrit phrasing probably used the past participle *prakṛti-parinirvṛta, as 
proposed by Lamotte (1938, vol. 2, p. 127), and attested in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra (see 
Lévi 1907, p. 68, l. 1–2: yo hi niḥsvabhāvaḥ so ’nutpanno yo ’nutpannaḥ so ’niruddho yo 
’niruddhaḥ sa ādiśānto ya ādiśāntaḥ sa prakṛtiparinirvṛta).
114 Skt. equivalent saṃdhāya for Tib. ldem po according to Yokoyama and Hirosawa 1996, 
s.v. mitsui 密意. See also Nagao 1982, p. 384: abhisaṃdhivacana. Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, p. 
127: “Les énigmes.” 
115 On the term paryāya (lit. “revolving, repetition”), see Nagao 1991, p. 132, and Bayer 
2010, p. 373, n. 220, p. 401, n. 339. See also Nagao 1982, p. 386, n. 2.
116 D4048 (fol. ri 23a7–b2), P5549 (fol. li 23a3–5): gzod (D: gzod; P: bzod ) ma nas zhi ba 
dang gzod (D: gzod; P: bzod ) ma nas ma zhi ba dang gnyis su med pa dang / rang bzhin gyis 
mya ngan las ’das pa dang / rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las ma ’das pa dang gnyis su med pa 
dang / ‘khor ba dang mya ngan las ’das pa dag kyang (D: dag kyang; P: dang) gnyis su med 
do zhes bya ba la sogs pa’i rab tu dbye ba dag gis (D: gis; P: ga) sangs rgyas bcom ldan 
’das rnams kyi ldem po dag thams cad rtag (D: rtag; P: brtag) pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs 
pa’i rnam grangs bstan pa bzhin du / ngo bo nyid gsum yin pa dag tu khong du chud par 
bya’o //. See Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 40; vol. 2, p. 127. See also Nagao 1982, pp. 381–88. 
Paramārtha’s translation (T no. 1593, 30: 121a25–28): 本來寂靜不寂靜無二。本來涅槃非涅槃
無二。生死涅槃無二。由如此等差別。諸佛如來依義密語。由此三性應隨決了. My translation 
“as being the three natures” follows the Tibetan. Lamotte (1938, vol. 2, p. 127) translates 
the final phrase as “doivent être comprises . . . à la lumière des trois natures propres” (to the 
same effect, Nagao 1982, p. 386). Paramārtha’s translation of Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya clarifies: 
“Therefore, following the three natures, one understands the correct explanation of perma-
nence, impermanence, and so on.” T no. 1595, 31: 193b23–24: 由此三 (for the Taishō read-
ing 三, the Song 宋, Yuan 元 and Ming 明 editions have er 二) 性應隨決了常無常等正 . No 
corresponding passage in Tibetan bhāṣya, P5551, fol. li 183a.
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when he emphasizes the doctrine of “One Mind” (Ch. yixin 一心).117 The 
expression “One Mind” does not figure prominently in Indian Yogācāra 
and gained prominence only through the apocryphal Dacheng qixin lun 大
乘起信論 (Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana; T no. 1666; 
hereafter, Awakening of Faith). The phrasing “One Mind” clearly entails the 
danger of substantialism, the idea that there is one inherently and eternally 
existing substratum, namely mind, behind all phenomena. Such a substra-
tum can easily be misunderstood as being one, and not being beyond one or 
many, beyond existence and nonexistence.
In order to avoid such a misinterpretation, it would be tempting to trans-
late the final four four-graph phrases of Wonhyo’s above passage as “The 
understanding of nonduality / is difficult to attain rightly. / The delusion that 
[apparent dualities] are one / is not easy to surpass.”118 Nonetheless, the 
more prosaic understanding of “one delusion” seems to be supported by the 
introduction to the commentary on the Longer Sutra. Here, the Longer Sutra 
commentary contains the same verses as the Shorter Sutra commentary until 
the phrase “ultimately not two sides.” After that, the commentary on the 
Longer Sutra continues not with the difficult phrases “The understanding of 
nonduality . . . ” and so on, but instead we read:
So, [as for] the original great awakening,
The accumulation of skillful actions119 leads to [its] attainment,
But the [constantly] consecutive flow of the long dream,
Cannot be opened up in one instant.120
If we follow the commonly accepted chronology, namely that the Longer 
Sutra commentary was written first, and that the Shorter Sutra commentary 
is its synopsis,121 it seems that Wonhyo shifted his attention, in this passage, 
from gradual original awakening towards nonduality and the understanding of 
dreamlike existence. This is, nonetheless, just a minor detail, and as a whole, 
117 On Wonhyo’s particular synthesis of Yogācāra, tathāgata-garbha, and “One Mind” doc-
trines, see Fuji 1997, pp. 262–63.
118 To this effect, Muller 2012, p. 216. Original text: 無二之覺取之良難迷一之夢去之不易 (T 
no. 1759, 37: 348a17–18).
119 “Skillful action” (K. gong 功) is here probably meant as an abbreviation for “virtue” (K. 
geongdeok 功德, the common equivalent for Skt. guṇa).
120 T no. 1747, 37: 125c6–9: [若斯動寂 皆是大夢。以覺言之無此無彼。穢土淨國本來一心。
生死涅槃終無二際。] 然歸原大覺積功乃得。隨流長夢不可頓開. See also the edition and trans-
lation in Muller 2012, p. 141, and Fuji 1997, p. 261.
121 See Tanaka 2004, p. 46.
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the true nature of mind and phenomena plays an outstanding role in both 
texts, as can be seen in another passage from the Longer Sutra commentary:
Buddha wisdom122 is free from characteristics.
When one returns to the origin of the mind, wisdom is the One 
Mind.
It is blended, equal, and nondual.
Because the initial awakening is exactly the same as original awak-
ening,
Therefore, there is not a single [external] object that would appear 
outside that wisdom.
Because of this principle, there is no object that would not be 
exhausted, and also, no limit exists.
Because the unlimited wisdom illuminates all objects without 
limitations.123
Wonhyo’s verses are clearly based on the Awakening of Faith,124 and he 
continues with a quotation from this text: 
As it is said in the Treatise on the Awakening of Faith:
The whole world of objects is originally One Mind.
It is free from apperception (*saṃjñā) and recollection (*smṛti).125
Further below, Wonhyo endorses another central concept from the Awaken-
ing of Faith, namely the doctrine that all phenomena are pervaded by the 
activity (K. yong 用) of Buddha wisdom. The passage quoted by Wonhyo 
reads:
122 My equivalent “wisdom” only insufficiently covers the connotations of ji 智, which can 
be used in a very rational and analytic sense, rather akin to “knowledge,” the English cog-
nate of jñāna. Nonetheless, since “knowledge” is rather unfit to render the unitarian aspect 
of ji, “wisdom” is preferred here with the risk of underrepresenting the analytical aspect of 
ji.
123 T no. 1747, 37: 131b12–15: 佛智離相。歸於心原。智與一心。渾同無二。以始覺者。即
同本覺。故無一境。出此智外。由是道理。無境不盡。而非有限。以無限智。照無邊境故. See 
also Fuji 1997, p. 264.
124 Doctrinally and terminologically, Wonhyo’s verses are closely related to the correspond-
ing passage in the Awakening of Faith: 法身 名本覺。何以故。本覺義者對始覺義 以始覺者
即同本覺。始覺義者依本覺故而有不覺依不覺故 有始覺。又以覺心源故名究竟覺不覺心源 (for 
the Taishō reading 源, the Old Song and Kongō-zō versions read yuan 原) 故非究竟覺 (T no. 
1666, 32: 576b14–18). See also T no. 1666, 32: 581a18–19: 於真如法中深解現前所修離相.
125 T no. 1747, 37: 131b15–16: 如起信論云。一切境界。本來一心。離於想念. This is a lit-
eral quotation from T no. 1666, 32: 581b21. See also Fuji 1997, p. 263.
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The Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, are free from the characteristic of 
seeing,126 there is no place they do not reach, because it is the true 
reality of the mind. In exactly the same way, the nature of all dhar-
mas itself manifests and illuminates all false dharmas. There is the 
activity of the great wisdom [and] limitless [compassionate] meth-
ods. Thus, sentient beings can obtain understanding.127
The above passages can offer no more than a first glimpse of Wonhyo’s 
Pure Land ontology. Although the treatment is preliminary at best, I hope 
to have demonstrated that Wonhyo places great importance on the views of 
mind and emptiness that he inherited from his Indian predecessors, while 
he also manages, in just a few lines, to take his stance on more specifically 
East Asian topics such as “One Mind” and its activity, original awaken-
ing, and sudden and gradual awakening. Using coherent metaphors and a 
rather dramatic entry to his commentaries, his style is exquisitely poetic and 
original, and at times it is difficult to draw the line between prose and verse. 
While Wonhyo’s expressive style somewhat differs from the rather mellow 
and technical MSg, his scholarly approach reenacts Asaṅga’s endeavors 
to endorse the doctrines of the Sukhāvatī sutras, going at great lengths to 
embed them in a general ontological worldview.
Wonhyo on the Place of Sukhāvatī on the Buddhist Path
Wonhyo was surely aware of the problematic issues around whether the 
doctrines of the Sukhāvatī sutras were to be taken literally, and the extent to 
126 In the systematics of the Awakening of Faith, “the characteristic of seeing” (Ch. jian 
xiang 見相) signifies the illusory subject that perceives external phenomena (see T no. 1666, 
32: 577a10–11: 二者能見相。以依動故能見。不動則無見, alternative readings omitted; see 
also Suzuki 1900, p. 72). Thus, the concept of “the characteristic of seeing” seems to cor-
respond to the “seeing part” (Ch. jian fen 見分) in Xuanzang’s adaptation of cittamātra 
systematics. On the latter, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 293. In the Awakening of Faith, the 
“characteristic of seeing” is the cause of “the characteristic of the objective world,” meaning 
the objects that appear to be different from perception, similar to Xuanzang’s “part of charac-
teristics” (Ch. xian fen 相分). See T no. 1666, 32: 577a11–12: 三者境界相。以依能見故境界妄
現。離見則無境界。Notably, in the Awakening of Faith, the “the characteristic of seeing” is 
caused by “movement” (Ch. dong 動), a central theme in Wonhyo’s metaphor of the wave and 
the ocean.
127 T no. 1747, 37: 131b17–21: 諸佛如來離於見相。無所不遍。心真實故。即是諸法之性。
自體顯照一切妄法。有大智用。無量方便。隨諸眾生所應得解[悉能開示一切法義。是故得名一
切種智]. This is a literal quotation from T no. 1666, 32: 581b23–26 (as for the bracketed part 
of the final passage, Wonhyo slightly diverges from T no. 1666, 32: 581b26–27: 皆能開示種
種法義。是故得名一切種智). See also Fuji 1997, p. 263.
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which they could lead to a discouragement, not encouragement, of religious 
practice. Some of his more general positions on soteriology shine through 
in the sections already quoted above, and we have seen that he considers it 
“not easy” (K. bur i 不易)128 to overcome dreamlike delusion, which cannot 
be unraveled in one instant (K. bul ga don gae 不可頓開). If we proceed fur-
ther along his commentary on the Shorter Sutra, he then seems to embark 
on the literalness of the Sukhāvatī sutras, firstly by reaffirming manifesta-
tions of the Buddhas:
Therefore, the manifestations of the Great Sage (Mahāmuni) exist 
far away and nearby.129
This can probably be understood as a commentary on the auspicious first 
word of the title, “Buddha,” which denotes the Buddha Śākyamuni who 
speaks the sutra. In fact, since the numerus of the nouns used here is not 
made explicit, Wonhyo might be referring to the one Buddha Śākyamuni as 
well as to a plurality of munis and buddhas at the same time. Then, possibly 
alluding to the second word in the title, “teaches/explains” (K. seol ), Won-
hyo continues:
The instructions taught [by Him] at times praise, at times 
blame.130
Thus, even though there are ultimately no distinctions in this world, the Bud-
dhas display/proclaim (K. jin 陳) preferences and dislike in the world, in a 
manner that is sometimes difficult to understand. Some theoretical back-
ground for this assumption is provided in the explanations on the four “inten-
tions” of the Buddha, as found in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra (ch. 12 
verse 18, quoted above): here, the exposition of [3.] another time (rebirth 
in a Pure Land) is followed by the fourth intention, “the disposition of a 
living being” (Skt. pudgalasyāśay[a]), which means the particular mental-
ity, the mindset that makes a specific living being receptive to one kind of 
instruction and not to the other. The proper assessment of this disposition is 
128 Cp. the expression “the way of easy practice” (Ch. yi xing dao 易行道, T no. 1851, 44: 
683b10) used for practices aimed at Sukhāvatī, as expounded by Lushan Huiyuan 盧山慧遠 
(334–416) and others. See Tanaka 1990, p. 55, 2004, p. 52, and Mochizuki 2001, p. 254.
129 T no. 1759, 37: 348a18–19: 所以大聖垂迹有遐有邇. See also Muller 2012, p. 216: “There-
fore the great sages leave their mark both near and afar.” “Manifestation” (K. sujeok 垂迹) 
can be translated more literally as “leaving a trace/mark.”
130 T no. 1759, 37: 348a19: 所陳言教或褒或貶.
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considered a key virtue of a fully awakened Buddha.131 Wonhyo’s phrasing 
that the Buddha’s words “sometimes praise sometimes blame” is an almost 
literal adoption of the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra’s explanation of the 
fourth intention, explaining why the Buddha praises some people for giving 
generous gifts and blames others for the very same action.132 Wonhyo fur-
ther emphasizes the intention behind the Buddha’s teaching by saying:
The Muni, the Sugata, appears on this impure earth in order to 
warn against the five turbidities and exhort us towards a [good] 
rebirth.133
This, again, explains why the Buddhas engage in seemingly mundane activ-
ity, acting in ways that are at times difficult to understand. We find this 
explained in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, in the section following the above-
quoted passage on the dharmakāya:
And therefore, again, the Bhagavat has appeared among the five 
turbidities, and by his dishonest, bad, and poor actions, beings are 
to be tamed.134
As can be seen above, Wonhyo finds it necessary to affirm, at the beginning 
of his commentary, that the Buddhas at times say things that are not true on 
a higher level. Although he does not make explicit how far this applies to 
the Sukhāvatī sutras, he seems to affirm Asaṅga’s position in the MSg.
A) The Buddha Amitābha Creates the Pure Land and Guides Living Beings
So far, in his commentary on the Shorter Sutra, Wonhyo has explained that 
there is ultimately nothing vile about the expedient means employed by 
the Buddhas. He has mostly commented on our defiled earth and Buddha 
131 See, for example, the exposition of the ten kinds of control (daśa-vaśita) in the 
Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya, where the ability to please the mind (citta-paritoṣaṇa) of 
all beings in whatever way appropriate appears as the ninth vaśita. The power to carry out 
the deeds of the Buddha in whatever way appropriate to beings forms an essential aspect of 
the tenth vaśita and marks the culmination of the tenfold list (Bayer 2010, pp. 295–96). This 
pedagogical insight into human nature played an even more dominant role in earlier descrip-
tions of the Buddha’s powers (see Schlingloff 1963, p. 38).
132 Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 6: kaśyacit praśaṃsate kaśyacit vigarhate. On the MSg parallel, see 
Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, p. 131; Nagao 1982, pp. 399–93; T no. 1595, 31: 194b18–19: 譬如如
來先為一人讚歎布施後還毀呰.
133 T no. 1759, 37: 348a19–20: 至如牟尼善逝現此穢土。誡五濁而勸往.
134 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 3, par. 46): atha ca punaḥ pañcakaṣāye bhagavān utpannaḥ / 
tenānarthalūhadaridracaryayā satvā vinetavyāḥ.
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Śākyamuni. Now, he turns to the Buddha Amitābha and his Pure Land, treat-
ing the two Buddhas in the order in which they appear in the title of the work 
(Ch. Foshuo Amituo jing 佛 阿彌陀經):
The Tathāgata Amitābha presides over his Pure Land. He pulls 
[there] the three classes of people and guides them to rebirth [in 
the Pure Land].135
The sutras lack detailed explanations about the mechanism by which the 
Pure Land is created (purified/adorned) in a concrete, physical sense.136 In 
Wonhyo’s commentary, the role of Buddha Amitābha is expressed by the 
polysemic term eo 御, basically indicating that he presides as the ruler of 
his Pure Land. Among the meanings of the word eo, we find “to arrange, to 
administer, to settle,” “imperial,” but also “to attend to [a certain task].”137 
This clearly indicates a conception similar to that of a worldly ruler, an over-
lord responsible for the material and spiritual well-being of his land. We have 
already discussed a similar notion implied in MSg doctrine of a “sovereign 
cognition that is eminently pure” (MSg X.30a.6). 
In the context of soteriology, it is often asked how the Pure Land doc-
trines can be aligned with the theory of karman. Do beings reach a state 
of bliss not by their own efforts, but rather as a bestowal of the Buddha 
Amitābha, regardless of their karman? If it is correct that Buddha Amitābha 
shares features of a worldly king, as Wonhyo’s use of the term eo seems to 
affirm, it should be considered that in Sarvāstivāda/Yogācāra karman doc-
trine, the external circumstances, that is, the fertility and the wealth of the 
country, are not the result of strict individual retribution. Rather, they come 
about as the “sovereign result” (Skt. adhipati-phala) of the actions of sen-
tient beings, among which, nonetheless, the overlord (Skt. adhipati) plays 
an exalted role.138 Significantly different from that, the external conditions 
135 T no. 1759, 37: 348a20–21: 彌陀如來御彼淨國。引三輩而導生.
136 See Gómez 1996, pp. 8–9. In the Chinese version of the Longer Sutra, the process of 
“adorning” the Pure Land is described, for example, in the following terms: “Based on his 
great adornment, equipped with many practices [?], he directed living beings to attain virtues. 
He remained in emptiness, freedom from signs and wishes of [all] dharmas. Without produc-
tion, without rising: He saw the dharmas to be like [illusory] transformations.” (T no. 360, 
12: 269c16–18: 以大莊嚴具足眾行令諸眾生功德成就。住空無相無願之法無作無起觀法如化. 
See also Gómez 1996, p. 174).
137 See Tōdō, Matsumoto, and Takeda 1993, s.v. yu 御.
138 See Hopkins 1906, p. 587; Bayer 2010, pp. 370–71. See also Harvey 2013, p. 261, on 
karman as the cause for timely rainfall. Abhidharma descriptions of the adhipati-phala deal 
with agriculture, and thus a rural setting, exclusively. In contrast, in the Sanskrit Longer Sutra, 
even though it is emphasized that “at the proper time clouds of heavenly perfumed water 
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found in the Pure Land are often explained to result from the power of the 
Buddha Amitābha’s virtues (/vows) alone.139 It would therefore contradict 
classical karman doctrine if the individual’s contribution to shaping and 
experiencing the environment is wholly denied, as Wonhyo’s commentary 
seems to affirm.140 Nonetheless, Wonhyo seems to be reserved with regard 
to this explanation,141 and he cautions his readers that there are different 
views on this issue.142
At any rate, it is certainly not the effort of the adept alone that brings 
about the desired leap towards liberation, and this is a significant difference 
from āgamic Buddhism. While the “Noble Eightfold Path” can be practiced 
whether or not a Buddha is present, the Sukhāvatī sutras teach that the Bud-
dha Amitābha plays an active role in elevating aspirants to the Pure Land, 
according to the Longer Sutra, even appearing before them with his retinue at 
the moment of death.143 Again, it depends upon a combination of the practi-
tioner’s initiative with the Buddha’s activity, in which the latter plays a domi-
nant role. Clearly, religious devotion plays an increasingly central role, as was 
drastically asserted in the doctrine of the “power of the other” (Ch. tali 他力), 
bring down rain” (Gómez 1996, p. 91), Sukhāvatī as a whole resembles a pleasance akin to 
the suburban setting of early monastic vihāras. In the Chinese version, solid monastic build-
ings with towers and lecture halls are added (see Gómez 1996, p. 181), resembling the later 
vihāra style, probably from Central Asia. On the development of vihāra architecture, see 
Schopen 2006; on rural and (sub-)urban imagery in Abhidharma and Sukhāvatī, Bayer 2010, 
pp. 354–55.
139 See the commentary on the Jingtu lun 浄土論, also called Wangsheng lun 往生論 (T no. 
1524, vol. 26, ascribed to Vasubandhu; hereafter, Treatise on the Pure Land ) by Tanluan, 
the Jingtulun zhu 淨土論註 (T no. 1819, vol. 40) as translated by Inagaki (1998, p. 74): “the 
three kinds of glorious accomplishment are, in their origin, [Dharmakāra’s] adornment with 
the Pure Vow-Mind through forty-eight vows and so on. Since the cause is pure, the result is 
equally pure. They are not what has come into existence without any cause or by some other 
cause.” T no. 1819, 40: 841b7–9: 此三種莊嚴成就由本四十八願等清淨願心之所莊嚴。因淨故
果淨。非無因他因有也. I have underlined the words from the Treatise on the Pure Land.
140 T no. 1747, 37: 128b7–8: 但承如來本願力故。隨感受用。非自業因力之所成辨. On this 
passage, see also Tanaka 2004, p. 53.
141 T no. 1747, 37: 128b8–9: 是故 無往生因.
142 T no. 1747, 37: 128b9: 此因之相經論不同. I am unaware of the exact discourses Wonhyo 
alludes to by “sutras and treatises.” Although Muller’s translation seems sensible (“The [expla-
nations of the] characteristics of this causation differ between the sūtras and the treatises,” 
Muller 2012, p. 175), an alternative interpretation in the sense of “between [various] sutras and 
treatises” might be legitimate, too. In fact, in the following passage, Wonhyo adduces sutra and 
śāstra doctrines in which the practices of the adept appear as a cause for rebirth in Sukhāvatī.
143 See Inagaki 2003, p. 31; T no. 360, 12: 272b18–20: 此等眾生臨壽終時無量壽佛與諸大眾 
現其人前即隨彼佛往生其國.
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entrusting one’s salvation to Amitābha alone, as emphasized, for example, 
in the writings ascribed to Daochuo 道綽 (562–645).144 Although Wonhyo 
acknowledges that Amithābha elevates beings to the Pure Land, he does not 
go so far as to recommend complete reliance on Amithābha alone.145
At this point, it might be worth reconsidering the conception of “method,” 
which can refer to fundamentally different activities. Above, Wonhyo men-
tions the manifestations of the “Great Muni,” as well as his skill in exposi-
tion. That is to say, the “Great Muni” adapts his teachings to the mental 
disposition of his listeners, so that the teaching of the Pure Lands could be 
no more than a method to attract beings to the Dharma, while factually not 
true. On the other hand, the Pure Land doctrine seems to imply a develop-
ment of this doctrine, namely that the Buddhas adapt their wondrous activity 
to the minds of sentient beings, which would support a literal interpretation. 
In this case, this would be the creation of the Pure Land and the transfer-
ence of living beings to that sphere, in accordance with the Bodhisattva 
Dharmakāra’s original vow, an activity adapted to the mindset of less 
advanced Buddhist followers.146 That is to say, when the Pure Land sutras 
are designated a “method” or “expedient means” (Skt. upāya, Ch. fangbian 
方便), it seems appropriate to distinguish whether this refers to a skillful 
teaching (which might not be true) only, or whether it includes a skillful 
activity, such as creating a Pure Land and guiding the deceased there.147
B) Ten Moments of Concentration on the Buddha Amitābha
How, then, can the Pure Land be reached? Wonhyo endorses the Longer 
Sutra’s famed doctrine that a person who has his or her mind concentrated 
on the Buddha Amitābha for at least ten (successive) moments will in fact 
reach this Pure Land after death,148 given other prerequisites that will be 
addressed below. That is to say, Wonhyo still belongs to the exegetes who 
144 On Daochuo, see Tanaka 1990, pp. 17, 45; Harvey 2013, p. 216. See also Tanaka 2004, p. 
53, on doctrines resembling the “power of the other” in Wonhyo’s commentaries.
145 See also Muller 2007, p. 2.
146 See also Tanaka (2004, p. 53): “ ‘The power of the Tathāgata’s original vow’ ([Ch. rulai 
benyuan li] 如来本願力) is conceived and imagined in accordance with the sensibilities of 
the people of unsettled nature.”
147 Cp. the summary of the Buddha Wisdom for Accomplishing the Tasks in Muller 2007, p. 
8. Muller confines his description to the passive/perceptive aspects of this Buddha-wisdom 
while leaving the active/creative aspects unmentioned.
148 T no. 360, 12: 272c6–7: 當發無上菩提之心一向專意乃至十念念無量壽佛願生其國.
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recommend “recalling” the Buddha (Ch. nianfo 念佛) in the sutra’s original 
sense of recollecting (Skt. smṛti) the Buddha and his virtues,149 without 
necessarily reciting his praise.150 In Wonhyo’s phrasing, “To the extent of 
ten [moments of] recollection, recollect, [while remaining] focused, that 
Buddha [i.e., Amitābha]!”151
Quite probably, the specific count of at least ten recollections, which the 
sutra requires, derives from and hints at another meditative practice: for a 
major part of the Indian Buddhist tradition, the very beginning of the Bud-
dhist meditative path consist in the recollection of the breath (Skt. ānāpāna-
smṛti), while counting the breath from one to ten.152 Thus, the ten moments 
of recollecting the Buddha Amitābha function as a preliminary concentration 
practice for those who cannot, in this life, pursue the practice of ānāpāna-
smṛti, and the successive path of śamatha and vipaśyanā meditations. When 
focusing single-mindedly on the Buddha with the hope for a good life after 
death, they can at least plant a seed consisting in ten moments of focused 
attention,153 a residue (Skt. vāsanā) that will hopefully resurface as a habit 
or ability for meditative concentration in the future.154 Hopefully, the (lay) 
followers who have completed the ten moments of focused attention will at 
some point attain rebirth under more tranquil conditions, in a place where 
they can practice śamatha, the contemplations on the Four Noble Truths and 
149 Hence Gómez (1996, p. 167) translates the respective phrase in the Longer Sutra as 
“bring to mind this aspiration for even ten moments of thought.” Cf. Muller 2012, p. 217, n. 8 
(“maintain steadfast mindfulness up to ten times”); Jang 2003, p. 178 (“ten time’s chanting of 
Buddha’s name”); and Suzuki 1997, p. 31 (“only thinking of me for, say, up to ten times”).
150 This has already been observed in Tanaka (2004, p. 50), “focusing of the mind on the 
Buddha, . . . differing from the oral recitation promoted most vigorously by Shandao.” None-
theless, the Longer Sutra is often considered “a locus classicus for the famous eighteenth 
[vow] of Amitābha, in which he promises Pure Land rebirth to those who chant his name” 
(Muller 2007, pp. 1–2).
151 T no. 1747, 37: 128b22–23: [二者。]乃至十念。專念彼佛。[是助滿業]. Muller 2012, 
p. 176: “For up to ten recollections, they single-mindedly focus on that buddha.” Of course, 
“up to” is meant here in the sense of “at least,” or “until [the count of ten is reached].” Cf. 
Suzuki (1997, p. 32): “one must pronounce the Name. . . . According to the Shin tradition, 
just one time is enough, but this sutra advises ‘up to ten times.’ In fact, pronouncing Amida’s 
name just once is enough, but if once is enough, then ten times will also be sufficient.”
152 Deleanu 1992, p. 52, referring to the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya (Pradhan 1967, pp. 339–
40).
153 On recollection of the Buddha as one of several methods to attain samādhi, see Harvey 
2013, p. 323. See also Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. samādhi.
154 On habitual actions in future lives, see Bayer 2010, p. 51.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 6 ,  1118
so on, the path to complete bodhi. According to the Pure Land sutras, this 
place will be Sukhāvatī in the very next existence. While this doctrine might 
have been viewed with some suspicion by those Abhidharma scholars and 
Yoga practitioners of ancient India who did not accept the Mahayana sutras 
as authentic, they might have been able to see the benefits of this practice, 
even if rebirth under more favorable conditions would mean human rebirth 
with a prospect of ordination at some point in the near or far future. In 
either case, there can be no doubt that the recollection of the Buddha for ten 
moments is not merely a devotional exercise. It is at the same time a mini-
mal exercise in samādhi.155
C) The Wish for Complete Buddhahood as a Prerequisite for Rebirth in 
Sukhāvatī
Still, according to the same passage in the Longer Sutra, a timespan of 
ten moments of recollection alone is not a sufficient cause for rebirth in the 
Pure Land. As is well known, the sutra advocates that there are three kinds 
of beings reborn in the Pure Land,156 namely, ordained members of the 
saṃgha, virtuous laypeople, and laypeople of lesser effort or merit.157 All 
three of them need to have the wish to be reborn in the Pure Land, focus 
on the Buddha Amithābha, and, most strikingly, all three have to gener-
ate bodhicitta, the wish to gain awakening and to become a Buddha for the 
sake of all living beings.158 Without this decision, rebirth in the Pure Land 
is impossible. Evidently, life in Sukhāvatī is by no means the ultimate goal 
155 Wonhyo’s profound discussion of the “ten [moments of] recollection” would provide 
plenty of material for a separate article. Neither his views nor the pertinent literature on this 
practice in East Asian Buddhism can be dealt with in appropriate detail here. Quite essen-
tially, Tanluan held that the original term (Ch. shi nian 十念) “does not mean ten times or 
moments, but a state of mental concentration, which he calls the ‘ten consecutive contempla-
tions’ ” (Tanaka 1990, p. 120). According to Mochizuki (2000, p. 162), Tanluan taught that 
“the devotee should with singleness of mind think on the Buddha Amitābha, and his mind 
should be interrupted with no other thoughts: when ten such thoughts succeed one another, 
this is what is termed ‘the ten continuous thoughts.’ ” While adhering to this doctrine, Tan-
luan vigorously propagated the recitation of the Buddha’s name as a practice that yields vari-
ous benefits (Mochizuki 2000, p. 161).
156 T no. 360, 12: 272b16: 凡有三輩. See Inagaki 2003, p. 31.
157 See T no. 360, 12: 272b16–c10.
158 T no. 360, 12: 272c4–7: 其下輩者 . . . 假使不能作諸功德當發無上菩提之心一向專意乃至
十念念無量壽願生其國. See Inagaki 2003, p. 32: “The lower grade of aspirants . . . although 
unable to do many meritorious deeds, . . . awaken aspiration for highest enlightenment 
and single-mindedly think of Amitāyus even ten times, desiring birth in his land.” See also 
Gómez 1996, p. 40; Tanaka 2004, pp. 49–50; and Jang 2003, p. 174.
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of this path.159 This does not contradict the assumption that life in the Pure 
Land was a more palpable goal than ultimate Buddhahood for a great num-
ber of followers, probably even the vast majority, who never read the sutra. 
Rather, when reconsidering Schopen’s designation of Sukhāvatī as a “reli-
gious goal,”160 I would like to suggest a clear differentiation of the subjects 
actively calling upon the Buddha Amitābha, as the sutra recommends. The 
intentions of various subjects were and are probably quite diverse, and for 
some, the ancestors’ being in the Pure Land collectively is probably more 
important than their own going to the Pure Land individually.161 Therefore, 
it seems more appropriate to speak of “goals,” some of which were never 
recorded in writing. On the other hand, as far as I see, the intent of the sutra 
itself is sufficiently clear.
The Pure Land is, according to the sutra’s doctrine, a den from which vari-
ous future Buddhas will emerge, no more and no less than that. As for this 
life, the sutra’s requirement of bodhicitta implies a hierarchy of values about 
good behavior in the world. Even though rebirth in the Pure Land is rela-
tively easy to attain, it is still the superior path to take ordination, do virtuous 
deeds and, in addition to that, wish for rebirth in Sukhāvatī. Among laypeo-
ple, again, virtuous activity according to the generally accepted principles 
of Mahayana Buddhism is superior to the lifestyle of a man or woman who 
aims for the higher goals but does not engage fervently in religious activ-
ity, even if this lack of engagement is due to unsurmountable obligations or 
obstacles in the present life.
D) Wonhyo on Bodhicitta as a Prerequisite for Sukhāvatī
Wonhyo developed the abovementioned doctrine by emphasizing a distinc-
tion between two kinds of human beings who have generated bodhicitta and 
made the wish to be reborn in Sukhāvatī, namely, (1) beings of “uncertain 
nature,” and (2) beings of bodhisattva nature.162 These two are widely known 
159 See Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 41; vol. 2, pp. 130–31.
160 Schopen 1977, p. 177.
161 This ancestral aspect of Pure Land faith is clearly reflected in the fact that Amitābha is 
in Japan addressed as Oya-sama 親様, a reverential term that, according to Suzuki (1997, p. 
25), “means parent, but not either parent, rather mother and father . . . united in one person-
ality.” This point is further elaborated by Hōzen Seki in his introduction to Suzuki’s book: 
“For example—my parents, my society, my nation, the air, earth, sun, etc.—all these powers 
of compassion are called Oya-sama. I cannot live in this world without Oya-sama. Oya-sama 
and I are in oneness” (Suzuki 1997, p. 9).
162 See T no. 1747, 37: 128b24 (不定性人), 128c1 (菩薩種性人). See also Tanaka 2004, p. 49.
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from a categorization of living beings into five kinds of potential, or five 
flocks of beings,163 a paradigm specific to Asaṅga’s tradition.164 Among those 
five, the group of uncertain nature (or potential) possibly has its historical 
roots in the Indian monasteries of Asaṅga’s time or earlier, when followers of 
the Bodhisattvayāna (Mahayana) and of the purely āgāmic traditions often 
lived side by side in monasteries. Quite probably, for one reason or another, 
some had not explicitly committed to the new trend though partly following 
its doctrines or rituals.165
If the above assessment is accurate, the allusion to beings of “uncertain 
nature” included committed practitioners of the āgāmic traditions with some 
Mahayana leanings in the Indian context, while in Wonhyo’s Korean context, 
such constellations were probably nonexistent or rare, since most Korean 
monks and nuns followed the Mahayana. Thus, in his commentary, the beings 
of uncertain potential seem to be characterized by a feeble commitment to 
Mahayana Buddhist practice as a whole, rather than a wavering between the 
āgāmic traditions and the Mahayana movement that had still been in the pro-
cess of taking a distinct shape at the time of Asaṅga.166
According to Wonhyo, the “uncertain” beings’ prerequisites for rebirth 
in Sukhāvatī are: (1) generating bodhicitta (the “proper cause,” K. jeong in 
正因), (2) awareness of Amitābha for ten moments of thought (the “assist-
ing, fulfilling action,” K. jo man eop 助満業), (3) the wish to be reborn in 
Sukhāvatī (no technical term).167 The second group, those of bodhisattva 
nature, have to fulfill the same three categories of requirements: (1) gener-
ating bodhicitta along with deep faith, (2) awareness of Amitābha for only 
one moment of thought, (3) the wish to be reborn in Sukhāvatī.168 
163 The etymology and semantics of the term gotra have been discussed, for example, by 
Dayal (1932, pp. 51–52), and Snellgrove (1987, p. 67, n. 87, pp. 111–12, 190).
164 The fivefold scheme consists of the widespread threefold categorization into Hearers 
(śrāvaka), Individual Buddhas ( pratyekabuddha) and Bodhisattvas, to which are added the 
two categories of persons of uncertain potential (aniyata-gotraka) and those who have no 
potential for awakening (agotraka). See Wangchuk 2007, p. 37.
165 See also my notes on the five gotras in the context of the “common vehicle” (Tib. theg 
pa thun mong). Bayer 2011, p. 71.
166 In terms of Asaṅga’s five-gotra doctrine, a person who has generated bodhicitta would 
technically cease to belong to the uncertain gotra and thus enter the Bodhisattva gotra. See 
also Tanaka 2004, pp. 50, 52.
167 T no. 1747, 37: 128b21–24: 初人三者。一者。假使不能作諸功德。當發無上菩提之心。是
明正因。二者。乃至十念。專念彼佛。是助滿業。三者願生彼國。此願前行和合為因。是明不
定性人也. See Tanaka 2004, p. 49. See also Jang 2003, p. 173.
168 T no. 1747, 37: 128b24–c1: 第二人中有三句者。一者。聞甚深法。歡喜信樂。此句兼顯發
心正因。但為異前人舉其深信耳。二者。乃至一念念於彼佛。是助滿業。為顯前人無深信故。必
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Strikingly, for the committed bodhisattva, it is not even necessary to 
uphold a focus on the Buddha Amitābha for ten moments of time. Thus, 
advanced practitioners are burdened with less meditative concentration than 
those lacking commitment. Why should that be so? Should we not rather 
expect that, for enthusiastic bodhisattvas, ten moments of recollecting the 
Buddha would be no more than a minor addition to the schedule of their 
daily vita religiosa?
So far, Wonhyo’s doctrine is in line with the sutra, which only requires that 
committed practitioners, both ordained and non-ordained, generate the wish 
to be reborn in the Pure Land, but does not prescribe any minimum time span 
for the [anu-]smṛti (Ch. nian 念) on the Buddha. Therefore, it is plausible 
to assume that the sutra’s indulgent handling of the bodhisattva’s anusmṛti 
serves a symbolic purpose rather than a practical one: the “certain” way of 
life of the active bodhisattva is surely the commendable lifestyle,169 superior 
to that of the “uncertain” follower who, nonetheless, will reach Sukhāvatī 
upon fulfilling minimum requirements.
E) Doubt, Faith, and Devotion
As seen above, even an advanced bodhisattva such as Maitreya is encour-
aged to strive for birth in Sukhāvatī, while pursuing his exalted career. At 
the same time, he is warned of the single most perilous factor that could 
seriously impede his sojourn in the Pure Land: doubt. Hence the Buddha 
speaks in another passage of the Longer Sutra: “Maitreya, you should 
know that you have, since innumerable kalpas, cultivated the bodhisattva 
conduct in order to save sentient beings.”170 Now, having made the wish to 
be reborn in Sukhāvatī, “In your next life [you will be in] the Buddha land 
of Amitāyus, [the land of] limitless delight. For a long time endowed with 
the virtues of the path, you will be forever liberated from the roots of birth 
and death, that is to say, there will be no troubles such as the painful afflic-
tions of desire, anger, and ignorance.”171 “Without [deliberate] action, just 
須十念。此人有深信故。未必具足十念。三者。以至誠心。願生彼國。此願前行和合為因。此
就菩薩種性人也. See Tanaka 2004, p. 50.
169 See also Muller 2007, p. 4: “Almost everything in Wonhyo’s text deals with ways in 
which rebirth in the Pure Land is contingent upon one’s own effort.”
170 T no. 360, 12: 275b28–29: 彌勒當知汝從無數劫來修菩薩行欲度眾生. See also Inagaki 
2003, p. 46 (section 33); Gómez 1996, p. 204 (§156).
171 T no. 360, 12: 275c9–11: 後生無量壽佛國快樂無極。長與道德合明永拔生死根本無復貪恚
愚癡苦惱之患. See also Inagaki 2003, p. 46 (section 33); Gómez 1996, p. 204 (§158).
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naturally, you will proceed on the path of nirvana. You should each dili-
gently proceed with this longing in your heart. If you hesitate with doubts 
that you might not obtain what you aspire for, and if you regret [your aspi-
rations] in the midst [of proceeding towards the Pure Land], then, because 
you yourself make that mistake, you will be born in the outskirts of that 
[Pure Land], in a palace made of seven kinds of jewels, and for five hun-
dred years you will suffer various misfortunes!”172
Although it is imperative to avoid doubt, we find little specification in 
this sutra passage how doubt can be recognized or categorized. If doubt has 
disastrous consequences, is it just any kind of doubt in one’s success on the 
bodhisattva path, or is it doubt in rebirth in Sukhāvatī? In this context, it is 
probably mostly the latter, as well as doubt in other aspects of the Dharma, 
with little need for a scholastic definition. Nonetheless, in a later passage of 
the Longer Sutra, we find a mention of doubt in the “unobstructed Buddha 
wisdom.” In the Sanskrit version, this is not further specified, and its most 
significant implication is probably doubt in the Dharma and in the teachings 
of this sutra.173 The respective passage in the Chinese version has been sig-
nificantly enlarged and restructured;174 it contains a list of four kinds (or epi-
thets) of Buddha wisdom. Doubting such wisdom will cause rebirth in the 
periphery of Sukhāvatī and exile to the jewel palace as described above.175
It is at this point that Wonhyo’s commentary on the Longer Sutra diverges 
significantly from the sutra’s original phrasing and doctrines, for he explains 
these four kinds of Buddha wisdom as corresponding, respectively, to the 
four kinds of Buddha wisdom taught in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra.176 
Only a correct and profound understanding of all Four Wisdoms qualifies as 
deep faith (K. sim sin 深信) and permits birth in the center of Sukhāvatī. On 
Wonhyo’s high standard for the desired goal, Tanaka (2004, p. 51) observes, 
172 T no. 360, 12: 275c13–15: 無為自然次於泥洹之道。汝等宜各精進求心所願無得疑惑中悔
自為過咎生彼邊地七寶宮殿五百 中受諸厄也. See also Inagaki 2003, pp. 46–47 (section 33), 
Gómez 1996, p. 204 (§158).
173 “They do not bring forth any doubt, they do not hesitate about the unhindered Buddha 
wisdom” (na vicikitsām utpādayanti, na kāṃkṣanty asaṅga buddha jñānaṃ, Ashikaga 1965, p. 
58). See also Gómez 1996, p. 105 (§136).
174 See also Gómez 1996, p. 241, n. 95, commenting on a rather abrupt transition between 
the sections (§136 and §137) in the Sanskrit version.
175 T no. 360, 12: 278a22–24: 若有眾生以疑惑心修諸功德願生彼國不了佛智不思議智不可
稱智大乘廣智無等無倫最上勝智於此諸智疑惑不信. Inagaki 2003, p. 58 (section 43); Gómez 
1996, p. 217 (§216). See also Jang 2003, pp. 172, 175.
176 On the four kinds of buddha-jñāna, see Satō 1985, Makransky 1997, pp. 100–103 (refer-
ring to Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra, ch. 9, verses 67–76).
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“Deep faith, thus, involves quite an advanced level of wisdom, for it entails 
realization of emptiness.” Accordingly, Wonhyo’s explanations of the four 
appear to be the apex of his commentary. Addressing the Four Wisdoms one 
by one, Wonhyo’s comments are clearly based on the traditional explana-
tions of Indian lore, into which he has skillfully interwoven a red thread 
of ascending insights with regard to the Pure Land, its reality and ultimate 
meaning:177
(1) In order to understand the “Wisdom for Accomplishing the Tasks” (K. 
seong jak sa ji 成作事智), one accepts that through ten recollections of the 
Buddha, one is reborn in Sukhāvatī, as the sutra teaches.178 It is this kind 
of wisdom that can accomplish such a feat,179 establishing an alternative 
to the ordinary six realms of existence. Doubting sentient beings wonder 
whether this mechanism is in fact effective enough to overcome the fetters 
of karman which, as the sutra teaches, do not wither away,180 let alone the 
habitual tendencies of the kleśas and clinging to the characteristics of phe-
nomena.181 Whether or not this matches the intention of the Chinese Longer 
Sutra, Wonhyo has identified the “Unthinkable Wisdom” mentioned in the 
sutra with the “Wisdom for Accomplishing the Tasks.”182 This seems quite 
appropriate when considering that “unthinkable” is a well-established des-
ignation for the powers of the Buddhas to carry out their specific tasks,183 
and Wonhyo illustrates this by listing a number of these tasks, such as anni-
hilating misdeeds and so on.184
(2) The “Wisdom of Subtle Observation” (K. myo gwan chal ji 妙觀察智) 
understands all phenomena as illusory, dreamlike, neither existent, nor non-
existent, free from language and thought.185 And still, even though one does 
not chase after words, one can name and measure all dharmas.186
(3) The “Wisdom of Equality” (K. pyeong deung seong ji 平等性智), 
among other qualities, is not fixated on the narrow doctrines of the “Small 
177 For the details of Wonhyo’s explanations, see Jang 2003, pp. 176–84, and the transla-
tion by Muller 2012, pp. 195–208.
178 T no. 1747, 37: 130b28: 經 十念念佛得生彼國. See Muller 2012, p. 200.
179 T no. 1747, 37: 130b27: 成作事智。所作之事.
180 T no. 1747, 37: 130b29: 如佛經 善惡業道。罪福無朽.
181 T no. 1747, 37: 130c3–4: 又無始來。起諸煩惱繫屬三界而相纏縛.
182 T no. 1747, 37: 130b4: 不思議智者。是成所作智.
183 See Kritzer 2002, Bayer 2010, p. 296.
184 See T no. 1747, 37: 130b7: 永滅多劫重罪. See also Muller 2007, p. 8.
185 See T no. 1747, 37: 130b10–11: 一切法。皆如幻夢。非有非無。離言 慮. See Muller 
2012, p. 197.
186 See T no. 1747, 37: 130b11: 非逐言者所能稱量. See also Muller 2007, p. 8.
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Vehicle,” but rather frolics in non-self, wherefore there is no non-self.187 
The power of this wisdom about a common essence can lead all sentient 
beings to the unsurpassed bodhi.188
(4) The “Great Mirror Wisdom” (K. dae won gyeong ji 大圓鏡智) is the 
return to mind’s origin,189 the true dharmakāya.190 Wonhyo’s final explana-
tions of the “Great Mirror Wisdom” form the ultimate culmination of his 
commentary, stating that “Buddha wisdom is free from characteristics, a 
return to mind’s origin; wisdom is the ‘One Mind.’ ”191 Having realized that 
“this initial awakening is exactly the same as original awakening,”192 one 
comes to understand that “therefore, there is not a single [external] object 
that goes beyond that wisdom.”193 Thus, “unlimited wisdom illuminates all 
infinite objects.”194
This abridged outline should suffice to demonstrate the gist of Wonhyo’s 
commentary: namely, outlining an ascending path of insight into the nature 
of mind and phenomena, culminating in the realization of the “One Mind” 
and resulting in a return to the world of mind-made phenomena. Wonhyo’s 
outline is strikingly similar to the process described in Vasubandhu’s Thirty 
Verses (see above), though it differs in its positive and affirmative depiction 
of the absolute. Notably, Wonhyo’s order of the Four Wisdoms reverses the 
sequence found in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra.195 Originally, the first 
Buddha wisdom (“Mirror Wisdom”) epitomizes the fundamentally mental 
nature of all phenomana, the second rises to the heights of nondualism, while 
the third represents a return to the phenomenal world with a clear analyti-
cal understanding, and the fourth the compassionate implementation of this 
understanding. In Wonhyo’s sequence, understanding seems to dawn with an 
apprehension of the Pure Land, which illustrates a Buddha’s activity, from 
which one moves towards analysis, nondualism, and the “One Mind” under-
lying all phenomena. Finally, this understanding permits a fundamentally 
new perspective on the phenomenal world. Considering that the original 
187 See T no. 1747, 37: 130b13: 不向小乘。遊無我故無不我. See also Muller 2012, p. 198; 
Muller 2007, p. 198.
188 See T no. 1747, 37: 130b14–15: 此同體智力。普載無邊有情。皆令同至無上菩提. See also 
Muller 2012, p. 198.
189 T no. 1747, 37: 130b17: 方歸心原. See Muller 2012, p. 199.
190 T no. 1747, 37: 130b19: 如是鏡智。正是法身. See Muller 2012, p. 199.
191 T no. 1747, 37: 131b12: 佛智離相。歸於心原。智與一心. See Muller 2012, p. 207.
192 T no. 1747, 37: 131b13: 以始覺者。即同本覺. See Muller 2012, p. 207.
193 T no. 1747, 37: 131b13–14: 故無一境。出此智外. See Muller 2012, p. 207.
194 T no. 1747, 37: 131b14–15: 以無限智 照無邊境. See Muller 2012, p. 207.
195 On the Four Wisdoms, see Makransky 1997, pp. 100–3, as mentioned above.
B AY E R :  E M P T I N E S S  A N D  L I B E R AT I O N 125
Sanskrit sutra mentions nothing more than doubt in the Buddha’s wisdom, 
and that the Chinese version contains only five general terms for awakened 
wisdom, the purpose of Wonhyo’s extensive explanations is, in my opinion, 
quite obvious—emphasizing the value of the more abstract and advanced 
contemplations, culminating in the doctrines of the Awakening of Faith.
For the most part, these contemplations consist in overcoming a set of 
four doubts in the four wisdoms respectively, doubts that are, as Muller 
(2007, p. 9) observes “all quite discursive in character, the kind of doubts 
that might be called failed attempts at thinking these cognitions through 
logically.” That being so, is the path advocated by Wonhyo a merely 
intellectual endeavor? How much time should the adept spend studying 
Mahayana systematics, as different from remaining in nondual medita-
tion on the Buddha wisdoms? Wonhyo’s instructions leave the aspirant in 
an uncertain place in the triangle between religious faith, rational study, 
and formal meditation. Or, if all that is required is a rational understand-
ing of the Five Wisdoms, would this not lead to the logical consequence to 
engage in compassionate activity, the implementation of the first Buddha 
wisdom, once this rational understanding has been obtained? Wonhyo pro-
vides hardly any guidance for the concrete application of his explanations. 
Nonetheless, he does provide a justification for different styles of religious 
life, depending on the aspirant’s situation and preferences. While this 
leaves some room for uncertainty, Wonhyo certainly supplies a coherent 
ontological and soteriological basis for Pure Land faith, even for readers 
who cannot pursue a prolonged path of study and practice in this life.
Since the final explanations on the “Great Mirror Wisdom” and the “One 
Mind” are based on the Awakening of Faith, Wonhyo closes this section 
with a longer quotation from said treatise, corroborating his points. Dra-
maturgically, we are clearly in falling action, and at this point, the reader 
acquainted with the Longer Sutra might have found himself either inspired 
to pursue the contemplations on the “One Mind,” or otherwise overwhelmed 
by the high demands put on the aspirant for the Pure Land. It is only in the 
final lines of his commentary that Wonhyo opens a window of opportunity 
for those who feel unable to realize the Four Wisdoms in an appropriate 
way: “Those whose minds are not yet open, if they revere the Tathāgata 
only (/profoundly), with single-pointed devotion and faith,”196 they can be 
reborn in the center of the Pure Land, not in the periphery.197 Of course, one 
196 T no. 1747, 37: 131b26–27: 心眼未開。仰惟如來。一向伏信. See Muller 2012, p. 209.
197 T no. 1747, 37: 131b28: 不在邊地. See Muller 2012, p. 209.
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may ask how this doctrine fits in with what has been said before. Evidently, 
doctrinal coherence is at this point no longer the focus of Wonhyo’s com-
mentary. After all, his final words seem to be very well in line with the doc-
trine of the sutra. His long and intense excursus on the Four Wisdoms might 
have been nothing more than a broad hint not to abandon the thoughts and 
practices of the Awakening of Faith, let alone bodhicitta.198
Summary and Review on Asaṅga and Wonhyo
The Indian Mahayana texts presented in this article seem to agree insofar as 
Pure Lands are understood as not existing inherently or absolutely. Rather, 
they have the nondual union of manifestation and emptiness as their ultimate 
nature. Within Indian Mahayana literature, I am not aware of any assertion to 
the contrary, that is, to the effect that the ultimate nature of Pure Lands is in 
any way different from that of the ordinary worldly realms. In this doctrinal 
point, the systematization of Mahayana doctrines as developed by Asaṅga 
seems universally valid. Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus that 
the auspicious attributes of Pure Lands are generated by the minds of the 
respective Buddhas; that is to say, they are, on a slightly less-than-ultimate 
ontological level, mental apparitions in which living beings can take part. 
This mental nature of the Pure Lands does not lessen their value in any way. 
Rather, they are seen as a wondrous display of the Buddha mind.199
As for the soteriological value of the Pure Lands, there seems to be wide-
spread accord that those beings aiming for the Pure Lands eventually reach 
there, gain a spiritually advanced stage, find the ideal conditions for fol-
lowing the bodhisattva path, and eventually attain complete Buddhahood. 
The commentaries are much less explicit on the question of when and under 
what preconditions the Pure Lands can be reached, and Vasubandhu’s expla-
nation is somewhat ambivalent when he states that the wish to be reborn 
198 Cp. Muller 2007, p. 13: “in terms of [Wonhyo’s] final assessment of the point of the sūtra, 
indeed, something very much like faith in other power is the final solution.” I can only agree 
with Muller in so far as mere faith is presented as a viable solution, and it might be the only 
viable solution for the majority of lay followers. Still, as said above, he provides justification 
for a variety of religious lifestyles, among which monkhood and intense religious activity are 
depicted as supreme.
199 See also Schmithausen 2014, p. 607: “the development of (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda 
thought is . . . characterized by a strong tendency to establish . . . the mind . . . as an interme-
diate level between fiction and ultimate reality, and on this level it was possible to create not 
only an elaborate ‘idealist’ Abhidharma-like system but also an elaborate theory of the Bud-
dhas and their salvific activity in the world” (my italics).
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there will eventually yield its result just like “one copper coin will become 
a thousand copper coins.”
In Asaṅga’s writings and Vasubandhu’s commentaries, it is evident that 
both authors recommend practicing the Dharma intensely in this lifetime. 
Although there is thus a certain value statement involved, the Pure Lands 
are seen as an excellent design by the Buddhas, especially for those who are 
not able or willing to engage more fully at this time and instead postpone 
their practice to their arrival in the Pure Lands. Therefore, Asaṅga used (or 
invented) the exegetical device of explaining the Pure Land teachings as 
being intended, by the Buddha, for “a later time” (kālāntara), without this 
implying any depreciation of those teachings. Vasubandhu’s comments on 
this doctrine have been translated by Paramārtha, and it is in his translation 
that we can find the compound “indolent wholesome roots” (Ch. lan duo 
shan gen 懶惰善根), which suggests more of a moralistic value statement 
than we can find in Vasubandhu’s original phrasing.
With his explanation of the intent that underlies seemingly contradictory 
sutras, Asaṅga could resolve the conflict between those texts emphasizing 
arduous practice in this lifetime and many consecutive eons, and those texts 
focusing on rebirth in the Pure Lands. His treatises formed an important 
foundation for the rapprochement of various Buddhist traditions, probably 
in connection with the unification of hitherto antagonist regions under the 
rising Gupta dynasty. While resolving conflicts inside the Buddhist tradi-
tion, Asaṅga also provided a legitimate explanation for the Pure Land teach-
ings as the word of the Buddha.
As for Wonhyo’s commentaries, it must first be remarked that he puts 
much more emphasis on dramaturgy and the aesthetic impact of his writing 
than do the Indian commentators. While presenting his interpretations in an 
often poetical style, he follows the doctrines of the early Yogācāra tradi-
tion quite closely. When he addresses issues such as “One Mind,” original 
awakening, and sudden/gradual awakening, he is probably not fully aware 
that these issues were discussed quite differently in India. Much of Won-
hyo’s writing is directed towards outlining the comforts and the spiritual 
opportunities of the Pure Land, while at the same time, he seems concerned 
about the aesthetic inspiration of his readers and the elucidation of the more 
abstract truths of Mahayana Buddhism. Notably, his assertion that “by 
awakening into signlessness, there is nothing that is not signified”200 offers 
200 T no. 1747, 37: 125c21: 入無相故無所不相.
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an exegetical perspective in which rational analysis and yogic unio mystica 
can reinforce each other.201
Asaṅga’s systematics carry the seed of a world-affirming doctrine, in 
which the suchness of the world, its underlying reality, and its manifold 
manifestations, can be seen as fundamentally positive and auspicious, even 
in our seemingly impure sahā world. There is little in the original Sukhāvatī 
sutras that would support such an interpretation, and the overall gist of the 
texts suggests a stark contrast between our manifest world full of badness 
and distress (duḥkha) and, in the beyond, the manifestation of goodness and 
happiness (sukha) by the Buddha of Limitless Light.
Insofar as our present human condition, and the condition of sam-
saric beings as a whole, is seen as primarily characterized by suffering, 
the Sukhāvatī sutras seem to basically conform to the teachings of non-
Mahayanist Buddhism. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Abhidharma-kośa-
bhāṣya, holds that the world as it is cannot possibly be the creation of one 
divine being, and if it was, a creator who would delight in it must surely 
have a disturbing appetite for misery; he must be a bloodthirsty Rudra.202 
On the basis of such a primarily negative view of samsaric life, a Pure Land 
as the creation of a compassionate Buddha can justly be understood as a 
negation of our world, a counterworld, so to say, in which all the pleasant 
appearances are characterized by sukha rather than duḥkha.
Still, as for Vasubandhu’s own position, recent research supports the tra-
ditional assumption that he already adhered to the cittamātra philosophy as 
systematized by Asaṅga when he wrote the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya, includ-
ing his sarcastic remarks about the creator god Rudra. Thus, his views about 
the underlying ultimate nature of phenomena was probably more optimistic 
than his “Sautrāntika” positions in the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya suggest.203
If we consider it possible that authors wrote with such covert intentions, it 
can be asked whether the Sukhāvatī sutras were not addressed to an audience 
for whom the teachings on emptiness, cittamātra, and the ultimate nature 
might not have been disturbing or even dangerous. This is at least Asaṅga’s 
claim, and it can be valid whether or not we hold the Buddha to be the author 
201 See also the Longer Sutra: “He penetrates the nature of all dharmas, realizes the signs 
of beings, clearly understanding all lands” (T no. 360, 12: 266b6: 通諸法性，達眾生相，明了
諸國).
202 See Pradhan 1967, p. 102, l. 5–10.
203 Although this theory, upheld most prominently by Jaini and his disciple Kritzer, is still 
disputed, their evidence seems rather convincing, and I have added my own observations on 
“Sautrāntika”-like positions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya in Bayer 2013.
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of the sutras. The authors of the Sukhāvatī sutras, it seems, let their ontologi-
cal views shine through only occasionally, if at all.
Even if the doctrine of immediate rebirth in Sukhāvatī was meant more 
literally than Asaṅga is willing to concede, all sources seem to agree that the 
insights gained by bodhisattvas in Sukhāvatī, up to nirvana, are identical to 
the insights gained by bodhisattvas anywhere else, and thus that the ultimate 
soteriological goal of the sutras conforms to the general Mahayana ideal.
Brief Reflections on Pure-Land Systematics Today
When considering modern presentations of Pure Land doctrines, it seems to 
be most pragmatic to learn from those teachers who have proved to be suc-
cessful in attracting and inspiring audiences and maintaining a stable saṃgha 
of followers. Among those, the Vietnamese monk Thích Nhất Hạnh (b. 1926) 
stands out for his wide global popularity, as well as for his emphasis on 
diversity, that is, adapting programs to specific groups such as young adults 
or overseas Vietnamese. In the introduction to his discourse on the Shorter 
Sutra, he opts to first emphasize individual practice and direct experience:
The notion that the Pure Land is an exterior reality, a place to 
be found far away in the western direction, is just for beginners. 
If we deepen our practice, the Buddha and the Buddha’s land 
become a reality in our mind. Our ancestral teachers have always 
said this.204
When taken out of context, this phrasing could lead to the wrong assumption 
that Thích Nhất Hạnh holds a somewhat denigratory view of the Pure Land. 
Nonetheless, his commentary mostly follows traditional views and thus nat-
urally presupposes the reality of the Pure Land.205 As he further states in the 
introduction: “Amitabha Buddha had a deep wish to make a Pure Land. He 
was able to create a place that had security, love, and favorable conditions 
for the practice.”206
204 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 23. In a similar way, Suzuki (1997, p. 24) claims: “Accord-
ing to my understanding, Pure Land is right here, and those who have eyes can see it around 
them. And Amida is not presiding over an ethereal paradise; his Pure Land is the defiled 
earth itself. It is now clear that my Pure Land interpretation will go directly against the tradi-
tional or conventional view.”
205 On the views of premodern and modern Chan (Zen) advocates, see also Tanaka 1987, p. 37.
206 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 23. Cf. the explanation by Suzuki (1997, p. 30): “Another 
idea held by Indian thinkers and religious figures is that when one attains spiritual perfec-
tion, the place where one is situated, or one’s environment, also changes. . . . When Amida 
attained enlightenment, therefore, the environment changed in the same way.”
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In these initial passages it is not the ontological aspect or the dharmakāya 
that concerns Thích Nhất Hạnh the most, but the Pure Land as a vision of 
an ideal society:
Every one of us has the same aspiration as Amitabha. We, too, 
want to establish a place where we can stay, where we can receive 
our friends and loved ones, a place to practice, study, and benefit 
from the presence of solidity, love, freedom, and peace.207
It is worth observing that Thích Nhất Hạnh, on this occasion, focuses on the 
social dimension and leaves a more philosophical approach to later sections 
of his commentary. Indeed, a view that regards the suchness of all phenom-
ena as the Buddhist summum bonum, beyond existence and nonexistence, 
does have its own dangers and promises. Asaṅga, for example, concludes 
his MSg with a warning against misinterpreting the doctrine of the timeless 
and limitless dharmakāya: if, based on this doctrine, adepts wane in their 
efforts, thinking that attainments are timeless and thus without a cause, this 
would be the wrong conclusion.208 Asaṅga thus clearly sees the potential 
for this doctrine to serve as a base for heedlessness, while at the same time, 
he does not deny the timelessness of the dharmakāya and its omnipresence 
throughout pure and impure lands; he is probably the most important theo-
retician ever of this doctrine. Thích Nhất Hạnh, too, seems to be concerned 
about the appropriate framework, namely social responsibility and every-
day practice, and only after this framework is properly established does he 
address the more transcendent and unitarian aspects of the Pure Land:
All of us have the body of flesh and blood. We also all have the 
body of the Dharma. Our Dharma body is Buddha Amitabha. . . . 
If Buddha Amitabha is our own Dharma body, we can never say 
that the Pure Land lies only in the West; it also lies in the South, 
the North, and the East, because it is our own mind and every-
where it shines brightly. This means that Buddha Amitabha is 
everywhere; Amitabha is limitless light and limitless life.209
207 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 23.
208 See MSg, ch. 10, section 39. See Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 99; Griffiths et al. 1989, pp. 
267, 376. Insofar as Asaṅga’s closing words of the MSg exhort man to endeavour despite 
omnipresent goodness, they bear a striking resemblance to the closing of Wonhyo’s Longer 
Sutra commentary, commending humility despite the grandeur of the “One Mind.”
209 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 29.
B AY E R :  E M P T I N E S S  A N D  L I B E R AT I O N 131
When speaking about the birds that provide enjoyable sounds and sights in 
Sukhāvatī, he asserts that,
From the point of view of the retribution of actions, they are cre-
ated by past actions. From the point of view of the Dharmakaya, 
they are a wonderful manifestation of the Dharmakaya and their 
nature is the nature of no birth and no death, no coming and no 
going.210
Many efforts have been made in the Japanese Pure Land traditions to rephrase 
traditional teachings and embed them in contemporary currents of science 
and philosophy. My knowledge of this literature is insufficient at best. Among 
the few sources I am acquainted with, the volume Toward a Contemporary 
Understanding of Pure Land Buddhism edited by Dennis Hirota (2000) 
deserves special notice, for the authors strive to find out what can, in mod-
ern times, still be considered to be true about the Buddha Amitābha and the 
Pure Land. They are seemingly determined to accept tradition as valid only 
when it proves applicable in contemporary thought. This honesty yields 
convincing results in statements such as:
Although Tathagata, or true reality, is said to pervade all beings, 
since it completely transcends the conceptualization of human 
intellect, ordinarily it lies beyond our awareness; its presence 
therefore holds no significance for our existence. As long as we 
remain ignorant of it, our delusional attachments bind us solely to 
samsaric life.211
While this honest and experimental approach is surely a delight to the aca-
demic reader with an interest in metaphysics, I am unaware how far it has 
been transported to the broader public in a constructive way. In conclusion, 
Hirota (2000, p. 247) contemplates whether the right “ontological presup-
positions” in combination with “current philosophical thought and cognitive 
science” might help to bring “Pure Land symbols into a frame of reference 
with sufficient resonance in the present,” so that, on a more social note, “the 
reinvigoration of this Buddhist path [will] contribute significantly to . . . global 
religious culture.” The efforts of Hirota and others might prove vital for the 
future of Shin Buddhism, even more so since these thought experiments are 
210 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 72.
211 Hirota 2000, p. 55.
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conducted freely and with the full awareness that academic success alone 
does not guarantee a broader reception.
In a way, our modern pluralist society has come to resemble ancient 
polytheist India, where preachers of various kinds roamed the villages, try-
ing to win the hearts of people. Modern times force increased demands on 
contemporary Buddhist teachers. In order to strive in such a volatile envi-
ronment, traditional groups need to adapt their teachings to diverse social 
groups with diverse needs. One of these needs is certainly the search for 
stability and continuity, as it can be found in traditional liturgy, ritual, and 
doctrines. This alone, nonetheless, can hardly be enough to carry the estab-
lished orders into the coming centuries. Traditional orders must develop a 
broad spectrum of activities in which the laity, especially the young, can 
find their connection with Buddhism, quite in line with the fourth kind 
of “intention” mentioned in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra, the intention 
directed at the particular mindset of living beings.212 The teachings on the 
existence and nature of the Pure Land and its significance for the individ-
ual’s path through life are no exception: they need to be continually recon-
sidered from a perspective of reevaluation and improvement (Jp. kaizen 改
善), carefully rephrased and adapted to a variety of audiences. In the words 
of Thích Nhất Hạnh:
When we think about Pure Land practice, we can only do so with 
an open and inclusive mind. Buddhism has 84,000 Dharma doors. 
We are very fortunate if we are able to discover one of these 
Dharma doors and our practice of it brings us happiness. We should 
be careful not to say that our way of practice is correct and all oth-
ers are incorrect. Such a statement is not in accord with the spirit 
of Buddhism. . . . Meditation and Pure Land differ from each other 
only in words, not in substance. Only if we have the ability to see 
the interbeing of the Meditation and the Pure Land can we under-
stand the words of this sutra.213
212 Skt. pudgalasyāśaya, discussed above.
213 Thích Nhất Hạnh 2003, p. 35.
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ABBREVIATIONS
Awakening of Faith   Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mayahana (Ch. 
Dasheng qixin lun 大乗起信論). 
D    The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa’-’gyur and bsTan-’gyur. 
120 vols. Ed. Yeshe De Project. Oakland: Dharma Mudranālaya. 
1981.
Longer Sutra   The Longer Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra (Ch. Wuliangshou jing 無
量壽經)
MSg   Mahāyāna-saṃgrāha.
P    Ei’in Pekin ban seizō daizōkyō 影印北京版西蔵大蔵経. 164 
vols. Ed. Saizō Daizōkyō Kenkyūkai 西蔵大蔵経研究会. 
Tokyo and Kyoto: Saizō Daizōkyō Kenkyūkai. 1955–61.
Shorter Sutra  The Shorter Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra (Ch. Amituo jing 阿彌陀經)
T    Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大蔵経. 100 vols. Ed. 
Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡辺海
旭. Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai. 1924–34.
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas  Sanskrit text of the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (Study Group on Bud-
dhist Sanskrit Literature 2006).
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